The History Of Salafism II

APPENDIX 2: Tamerlane A Salafist?

There is debate about whether to categorize Timur of Kesh as a Sunni or a Shiite.* The available evidence indicates that he was personally ambivalent to this binary taxonomy. Indeed, such clear-cut categories may not have even been fully articulated in the way with which we are now familiar.

Be that as it may, Tamerlane can be most accurately described as a tacit Salafi. Though he seems to have been quite interested in Ali (a fixation on Ali is a hallmark of Shiism), Tamerlane did not conduct himself as an inveterate Shiite. While he was clearly incensed by the murder of Rashidun caliph, Ali’s sons, Hasan and Husayn; it does not follow that he identified with an explicitly Ali’d creed.

A few elementary points are worth making. Here are ten of the most notable:

First: It is well-attested that Tamerlane’s chief advisor was a Hanafi theologian from Khwarezm. The Hanafi madhhab is the most prominent Sunni school of jurisprudence; it has never been a “fiqh” associated with Shiism (though the Zaydi fiqh has some resemblances). Note, for instance, that Deobandism (arguably the most fanatical Salafi sect, as demonstrated by the Taliban) uses the Hanafi school of jurisprudence.  So did Daesh.

Second: When Tamerlane overtook Anatolia in 1402 (ousting Ottoman sultan Bayezid), he sought to re-install the Seljuks to power. The Seljuks were Sunni. This would have been a bizarre goal had Tamerlane’s primary concern been stymying Shia hegemony. He could have easily declared Shia dominion had he so desired.

Third: Tamerlane never made any declarations about Shiism per se (that is: explicit professions of Ali’d fealty); nor did he express any grievance with Sunnism. In fact, he never even broached the topic; and so seemed unconcerned with the distinction. When establishing his regimes, he spoke only of Islam. Indeed, it was a zeal to do god’s work that led him to do much of what he did.

Moreover, he never mentioned the “Ahl al-Bayt” [People of the House; spec. Ali and MoM’s daughter, Fatimah] in his rhetoric–something that an explicitly Shiite leader would have been inclined to do, as it was integral to Shiite vernacular.

Fourth: Tamerlane never discussed the “mahdi”–a topic that a world-conquerer would surely have addressed had he thought of himself as a Shiite. The pending “mahdi” is a focal point of all Shiite leaders; as it is a key element in conceptions of Providence when undertaking enterprises in the present. Consequently, it plays a pivotal role in Shia eschatology. At no point did Tamerlane invoke this eschaton when rationalizing his aggressive agenda.

Fifth: Tamerlane seemed unconcerned with the issue of the imamate–a matter he would have been behooved to address had his aim been to establish Shia dominion, with himself as undisputed ruler. The proper imamate is the lynchpin of Shiism’s contradistinction with Sunnism.* In refraining from anointing himself imam, he seemed to be exhibiting a concern for bloodlines (i.e. his own lack of qualification, being as he was Turkic-Mongol). Such a concern is germane an Ali’d point of view. However, a fixation on bloodlines is not unique to Shiites; as Sunnis have been equally obsessed with lineage back to MoM. The difference is that Sunnis did not necessarily let this issue get in the way of designating caliphs. Tamerlane’s concern about NOT being a descendent of MoM–and therefore not being qualified to adopt the vaunted mantle, “imam”–is compatible with Shiism; but, in itself, it merely attests that he valued bloodlines.

Sixth: Tamerlane is not recorded as ever having invoked the Shia addendum to the Shahada, “Ali-un wali-u-llah”–something about which he would have been adamant had the promotion of Shiism been part of his agenda. As noted, he may have had a fixation on Ali for personal reasons–about which we can only speculate. Yet this did not seem to translate to an explicit sectarian identity.

Seventh: The only notable Shiite regime in the Far East was the Bahmani sultanate in the Deccan of India, ruled at the time by Taj ud-Din Firuz “Shah”. The Shah was best known for his (inordinate) TOLERANCE of Hindus, as well as his promotion of a multi-cultural, intellectually-vibrant society. Moreover, the Shah never sought territorial conquest. In other words: the most noteworthy Shiite in the region was the sort of Muslim with which Tamerlane had the LEAST in common.

Eighth: Tamerlane slaughtered plenty of Shiites–notably, the Oghuz “Kara Koyunlu” (a.k.a. “Black Sheep Turkmen”) of Armenia. The Kara Koyunlu were vassals of the Jalayirids. In fact, that was the tribe that probably caused Tamerlane the most headaches. In undertaking his campaign in Anatolia, Tamerlane opted to ally himself with the “Ak Koyunlu” (a.k.a. “White Sheep Turkmen”), who were SUNNI. Tamerlane is not known to have ever spared anyone simply because they were Shiite. Meanwhile, he IS known to have spared Sunnis on numerous occasions; and so clearly did not see their Sunnism as problematic. So far as any Shia / Sunni distinction may have gone, there were overriding factors governing his decisions.

Ninth: Pursuant to gaining control of the Middle East, Tamerlane did not see fit to consecrate any of the holiest sites of Shiism: neither at Najaf nor at Rey, nor at Kufa.  Most notably, at no point was he inclined to devote special attention to Karbala, the holy city that has a special place in the Ali’d tradition (that is: within Shi’ism).  If he were a tried and true Shi’ite, Tamerlane would have certainly made Karbala a focal point when orchestrating his conquests of that region.  He did not.

Tenth: Tamerlane’s successor–his grandson, Khalil Sultan–was Sunni. The Timurids were all Sunni. His most celebrated descendent (Babur) founded the Mughal Empire, which was Sunni. None of them felt as though they were in any way betraying Tamerlane’s legacy.

Yet Tamerlane is rarely associated with Salafism. So what’s going on here? There seems to have been an effort by Islamic hagiographers (who happen to be overwhelmingly Sunni) to distance themselves from the most horrific genocidal maniac in history. Since he was obviously Muslim, their only recourse is to paint him as not SUNNI (and thus as a pesky, meddling Shiite). Unsurprisingly, Shiites are also reluctant to claim him as one of their own.
What we do know is that all that Tamerlane did, he did in the name of Islam. To rationalize his deeds, he simply proclaimed that he was doing god’s will. It is plain to see that religiosity was not only operative, it was the primary animating force behind Tamerlane’s megalomania–as is usually the case when a megalomaniac is prone to cultic thinking.

Meanwhile, unscrupulous historiographers are inclined to conflate Tamerlane of the (Turkic) Barlas clan with Genghis Khan of the (Mongol) Borjigin clan. They blame most of the atrocities perpetrated by the former (who waged a holy war against kuffar) on the latter (who, even in the midst of his voracious conquest, actively promoted religious tolerance). In the eagerness to paint the dastardly Mongol hordes as mindless, blood-thirsty savages, all Mongolic conquerers are lumped together across the centuries…even when they may have had almost nothing to do with each another. Consequently, the (Tengri-ist) Genghis is often blamed for the humanitarian atrocities perpetrated a century and a half later by the (Salafi) Tamerlane.

(I explore this matter in footnote 10 above.)

The Sunni-Shia dichotomy was not salient when it came to Tamerlane’s religiosity; though he certainly saw himself as carrying out the vision of the Sahabah…and, presumably, the Salaf.  Perhaps the best we can say of this infamous conquerer (vis a vis his creed) is that he was a non-denominational Islamic fundamentalist. As is clearly outlined here, all his campaigns were explicitly undertaken as a holy war; and were primarily animated by religious zealotry.

Tamerlane’s tomb is found in the mausoleum of Gur-i Mir–replete with inscriptions of Islamic tribute.

{* Ancillary note: The schism between the two denominations initially pertained more to the proper succession of leaders (caliphs). This disputation boiled down to the manner in which MoM’s cousin, Rashidun caliph Ali [ibn Abi Talib] should be viewed. Would the succession proceed according to bloodlines (in which case the Ali’d lineage would prevail, in the form of the divinely ordained imamate) OR would it proceed through MoM’s deputy, Abu Bakr…in which case the caliphate would be recognized based on other criteria (demonstrated fidelity)? There were, of course, a few doctrinal discrepancies as well–such as the number of daily prayers: 3 vs. 5, the preferred school of jurisprudence, which parts of the Sunnah to emphasize, etc.}