The Long History Of Legal Codes

APPENDIX 4: Karl Marx

{Note: All Marx quotes are from The Marx-Engels Reader.}

It’s worth starting with the Scottish philosopher (and political economist), Adam Smith, as he spoke out against systems of exploitation; and expressed concerns about workers being alienated from their work.  He articulated the dangers of power asymmetries; whereby one party (those with means) uses its leverage to lord it over everybody else (the rank and file).  As Smith saw it, problems arose from the gross power imbalance between business owners and wage laborers; the latter of which were the REAL creators.  He couched this dichotomy in terms of masters vis a vis workers. Marx would re-cast this in terms of capitalists vis a vis proletarians.

Adam Smith foresaw that the State would come to be held hostage by plutocrats; and would consequently support financiers / rent-seekers over the working class—that is: govern according to corporate interests in lieu of the general welfare.  The former typically forces the latter into compliance with their own (self-serving) terms.

Such power asymmetry led to societal dysfunction; and undermined democracy. In his magnum opus, “The Wealth Of Nations” (March of 1776), Smith lamented: “We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to raise it” (p. 83-84).  In other words: It was unfair that businesses owners could collude to more readily exploit labor, while labor was not afforded the chance to combine its leverage to counteract this power imbalance.  Smith noted that legislators neglect to regulate the practice of monopoly is a form of inaction; but it is also a kind of action; as it is a deliberate choice to favor the interests of the business owners in who’s sway they are.

Naturally, then, Smith recognized the importance of organized labor; and foresaw the ills of corporatism.  He stated that when State enacts regulation that favors laborers, “it is always just and equitable”; however, when they favor the owners, “it is sometimes otherwise” (p. 157-158).  It is important, then, that legislators’ deliberations be directed “not by the clamorous importunity of partial interests, but by an extensive view of the general good” (p. 472).  What Smith found objectionable about legislators being captured by corporate interests was that the State is held hostage by moneyed interests rather than considering “an extensive view of the common good” (p. 91).

Smith assert that it is a matter of “equity” that “they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of people should have such a share of the fruits of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged.”  He added that “no society can be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable” (p. 96).  He added: “It is in the progressive state…that the condition of the laboring poor [that is: of the great body of people] seems to be the happiest and most comfortable.”  Moreover: “The progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty state” (p. 99).  Marx couldn’t have said it better himself.

It should be noted that the famous passage in “The Wealth Of Nations” about the circumscribed interests of town craftsmen was NOT in praise of self-interest.  It reads: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”  Here, “interest” might be read as “ambit of concern” (the horizon of one’s interests is often circumscribed by the scope of one’s vocation). The passage was simply acknowledging the logistics of specialization (i.e. the advantages of a division of labor in any given municipality).  This pertained to modest-sized, local operations; not to massive, trans-national corporations driven solely by a profit-motive.  To wit: It was not a clarion call for avarice.

In his discussion of the disastrous effects of corporations (read: the British East India Company) on international trade, Smith expressed contempt for the tendency to leverage monopoly power to maintain domination.  He compared such a leviathan to “an overgrown, standing army [that has] become formidable to the government; and upon many occasions intimidates the legislature.”  Thus the problem of corporatism.

Smith noted that any M.P. who voted with such corporations enjoyed a quid pro quo, garnering “great popularity and influence with an order of men whose number and wealth render them of great importance” to political careers (p. 471).  Smith recognized the peril of a politicians being in the pockets of the rich and powerful: “Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always the masters” (p. 157).  When money controls politics, Smith recognized, genuine democracy is untenable.  A system where legislation is bought and sold to the highest bidder is not democratic; it is plutocratic.}

Also in “The Wealth Of Nations”, Smith held that “the original foundation of all other property” was the recognition that the property of each man in his own labor (p. 138).  In other words, each man owns the fruits of his own toil; and THAT was the core form of property from which all other forms of property derive.  He even specified that labor, properly conceived, was “the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities” (p. 47).  Consequently, each man’s ownership of (the product of) his own labor was to be deemed “the most sacred and inviolable” form of property.

After all, our own labor is that which permits us to express ourselves toward others on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity, recognizing each other as dignified human beings.  This foreshadowed Immanuel Kant’s “Kingdom Of Ends”, whereby every one of us—irrespective of socio-economic position—must never treat another as a means only; but—in all one’s dealings—recognize each individual as inherently valuable.

For Smith, the fact that workers were often forced to fawn like dogs to business owners was highly problematic.  He noted that workers were usually prevented from using their labor power in the way they wished; and that THAT was a violation of property rights; as well as an insult to their dignity as fellow humans.  Such a scenario was, in a sense, a transgression against humanity.

Smith said of “the property which every man has in his own labor” the following: “As it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable.”  He added: “The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands.  To hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in whatever manner he deems proper (without injury to his neighbor) is a plain violation of this most sacred property.”  In fact, Smith went so far to say that such a deed “is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman and of those who might be disposed to employ him.”

In this respect, Karl Marx echoed Adam Smith.  In fact, Smith would have been the first to note that, in the age of transnational corporations, the so-called “invisible hand” of the market often gets arthritis; and experiences horrific seizures from time to time.  He also made clear that public investment was a key part of maintaining a civil society (or, as the U.S. Constitution’s Preamble put it in 1787: A key role of the State is to facilitate “the general welfare”).  In the Wealth of Nations, Smith advocated for the State’s role in providing universal public education; and emphasized the need to pay heed to the flagrant injustices occasioned by inequalities of property, which invariably lead to societal insecurity (Wealth Of Nations, p. 709-710).  (For contemporary scholarship on this point, see Pierson and Hacker’s “The Spirit Level”.)

Marx’s concern with regard to concentrated power wasn’t limited to financiers / rent-seekers (“capitalists” in his parlance) and the use of capital to enslave the masses.  Marx ALSO expressed suspicion of an overly-powerful State apparatus.  He stipulated that we were to subject “the State as such” to constant criticism (ibid.; p. 30).  This wariness of Statism is expressed in his indictment of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.  Marx was aware of the dangers of the consolidation of power into fewer and fewer hands, no matter the form it took—economic or political; as both were a matter of establishing the conditions of material existence.

Marx’s solution was a communal treatment of societal resources–especially what we would now refer to as “public goods” (public healthcare, public education, etc.)  The notion of a socialist commune was not unique to Marx.  It dates back to the ancient Incan “ayllu”, which played a pivotal role in creating a thriving empire in South America during the Middle Ages.

So far as Marx was concerned, the sine qua non of any movement was individual emancipation from oppression at the micro-level; and global human solidarity a the macro level.  Each was seen as a condition for the other.  Thus liberty and unity were symbiotic, as a society of atomized individuals–each left to fend for himself in a dog-eat-dog world–could not possibly provide the necessary conditions for civil society.  Socio-economic justice was untenable when it was every man for himself (devil take the hindmost).

In this vain, Marx’s primary goal was eliminating systems of domination / exploitation via collective action (be it organized labor or some other kind of well-orchestrated civic action).  Unlike Bakunin and those advocating for Stateless socialism (a.k.a. libertarian socialism; anarchism), Marx did not equate institutions of concentrated power (which he held in contempt) with the “State” (which he equated with the demos).  He praised the scenario in which “every member of society is an equal partner in popular sovereignty, and treats all the elements that compose the real life of the nation from the standpoint of the State” (p. 33).

In light of this, only those who have the public interest in mind are entitled to be State officials (i.e. civil servants); as their charge was predicated on civic-mindedness.  No party can be charged with civic responsibility unless it “is felt and recognized as the general representative of the society.  Its aims and interests must genuinely be the aims and interests of society itself, for which it becomes in reality the social head and heart.  It is only in the name of general interests that a particular [group] can claim general supremacy” (p. 62).

This sense of “communism” is characterized by the dysfunctions it eliminates more than by the specific structures it erects: “Communism deprives no man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation” (p. 486).  Thus “communism” (in the Marxian sense) is about increasing liberties and eliminating subjugation and oppression of the many by the few.  By “communism”, then, Marx essentially meant “democracy” (p. 167).

As with democracy, communism was a dynamic, not an ideology.  (I explore this point in my essay, “America’s National Origin Myth”.)  Of the ten recommendations at the end of the Communist Manifesto, five are worth noting: progressive taxation, high inheritance tax, no for-profit banking (financialization of the economy), socialized communication and mass transit systems, and universal public education.  Also mentioned: child labor restrictions.  (Surely, Marx would have included universal public healthcare had he expanded the list.)

Marx defined “individual liberty” as an omni-symmetrical condition: “the power a man has to do everything that does not harm the rights of others.”  Moreover, “liberty as a right of man is not founded upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man from man.  It is the right of such separation.”  Hence: Freedom TO entails a freedom FROM.  According to this, “every man is equally regarded as a self-sufficient monad” (p. 42).  This illustrates the high degree that Marx valued individual autonomy and personal prerogative.  It also shows how he recognized that freedom requires that one party never be able to impose upon another.  Thus “freiheit” is concomitant with “unabhängigkeit”: each individual is sovereign over his own life (his own person, his own mind), which includes his own life choices.  Freedom, then, is a function of personal prerogative: the ability to engage in creative activity of one’s own accord on one’s own terms. 

Marx tied all of this to the economic exigencies (read: power structures) in which people live their lives.  He thus spoke of “a definite form of activity of…individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part.  As individuals express their life, so they are.  What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce.  The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production” (p. 150).

Creative activity, it is important to note, was based on autonomy–that is: personal prerogative.  This means that a person needed to be at liberty to produce on his own terms.  “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of the living human individuals.  Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature” (p. 149). 

In keeping the ideal of “species being”, Marx was concerned with universals: that which is shared by all humans (AS fellow humans).  Universal human emancipation was the corollary of our shared humanity; and so was the ultimate end of revolution (against concentrated centers of power).

Marx noted that the relationship between power structures and the working class involves a positive feedback loop of domination / exploitation and subservience, which perpetuates the established order.  In this vicious cycle, the proletariat is forced to enhance its own chains in order to simply stay afloat (p. 209-211).  Man is thereby forced to perpetuate his own subjugation, and abdicate his own “freiheit” / “unabhängigkeit”.

Understanding his emphasis on individual autonomy, we find that Marx meant something very specific by “private property”, which was posited in contradistinction to “truly human social property” (public property).  Marx was concerned with property’s “class character”, not insofar as it is something for personal use (p. 485).  This involves the distinction between use value and exchange value (reflecting Aristotle’s distinction between natural and unnatural finance).  A man was free to use property for himself, on his own terms, of his own accord, so long as it was a matter of personal utility…as opposed to using property as a means of subjugating others (that is: as “capital”).  Marx openly recognized the legitimacy of NON- “private property” property for personal (non-communal) use: the right to enjoy the fruits of one’s own labor (p. 42). *

Marx criticized “private property” only insofar as said property is a means of domination and exploitation.  “Is not private property ideally abolished when the non-owner (non-capitalist] comes to legislate for the owner of property [capital]?  The property qualification is the last political form in which private property is recognized” (p. 33).  The misleadingly labeled “private property” was not problematic insofar as it was “private”, but insofar as it was used as a means of exploitation.  It did NOT correlate with what we now dub “private property” qua personal ownership.

Whenever Marx refers to “private property”, then, he is referring to none other than “the material, summary expression of alienated labor.”  Thus “private property” is defined as the physical embodiment of systematic exploitation; NOT in the manner that it is defined today (something I purchase for my own use).  Insofar as property is not the means by which men are systematically exploited, it is not “private property” in Marx’s sense of the term. (Also see p. 81.)  It is the “class character” of private property that makes it un-conducive to a healthy society (i.e. a society socio-economic injustice); as such a society is not characterized by systems of domination / exploitation.  “When capital is converted into common property, into the property of all members of society, personal property is not thereby transformed into social property.  It is only the social character of the property that is changed.  It loses its class-character” (p. 485).

Marx went so far as to refer to “bourgeois private property”, which he defined as “the final and most complete expression of the system of…exploitation of the many by the few” (p. 484).  “Hard-won, self-acquired, self-earned property!  Do you mean the property of the petty artisan and of the small peasant, a form of property that preceded the bourgeois form?  There is no need to abolish that ” (p. 484-485). *

Marx elaborated on this point: “All we want to do away with is the miserable character of [said] appropriation, under which the laborer lives merely to [as a means to another’s end] to increase [another’s] capital, and is allowed to live only insofar as the interest of the ruling class require it” (p. 485).  “’Estranged labor’ is the direct cause of private property.  The downfall of the one aspect must therefore mean the downfall of the other” (p. 80).  Only when it came to the means of production (and what we’d now dub “public goods”) was collective ownership necessary.

Marx’s concern was concentrated power, in that it entailed domination by the few over the many (read: the exploitation of the rabble).  This included what he once presciently called “the aristocracy of finance” (p. 601); those whom Roosevelt later called as “the malefactors of great wealth”.  This referred to those who “set in motion all the mainsprings of credit…in which the trading world can only maintain itself by sacrificing a part of wealth, of products and even of productive forces to the gods of the nether world…” (p. 217).  This last menace amounted to the highly-concentrated centers of wealth now known as “corporations”.

Even more presciently, in 1851, Marx warned of “mortgage banks that parlay their acquisitions into debt [hyper-leveraging] and accelerate the concentration of property [capital accumulation]” (p. 616).  Marx’s view of consolidated power is based on his very specific conception of “capital”: the means by which a select few are able to ever further consolidate power for themselves at the expense of everyone else (p. 208, 208-209).  Capital, he wanted to make clear, is social and political power (p. 485); not to be conflated with money that are used to fund a pro-social enterprise (a.k.a. “capital”).

Marx had a problem with capital insofar as it was the primary means by which the rabble’s life / labor was “appropriated” by those wielding socio-economic power.  “All that we want to do away with is the miserable character of this appropriation, under which the laborer lives merely [as a means] to increase capital, and is allowed to live only insofar as the interest of the ruling class requires it” (p. 485).  Like Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant before him, Marx recognized: To the extent that a human is forced to exist solely as a means to the aggrandizement of another, injustice is afoot.

A class that possesses nothing other than its capacity to sell its labor is an exploited class.  Such a class is required for the existence of capital, as the raison d’etre OF capital is such exploitation.  Capital is accumulated (surplus) labor, and the fruits thereof; which, instead of serving the interests of a few oligarchs, could be used to facilitate the commonweal.  When labor serves as the means by which a well-positioned few accumulate power, it represents the ability for the owners of the capital to buy MORE labor, thereby perpetuating the system of domination / exploitation.

Alas, Marx’s name was soon appropriated by anti-Marxian forces.  (Marx would not have endorsed most of what came to be dubbed “Marxisim”; nor Soviet-style “communism”, which were–effectively–right-wing movements.  It might be noted that RIGHT-WING collectivism (which, rather than civic-minded-ness, was a matter of cultic thinking; predicated as it was on Exceptionalism and groupthink) was first propounded by Joseph Mazzini in his “On The Duties Of Man”.  This was the antithesis of the Marxian conception of collective action as propounded by, say, Antonio Gramsci.

{*  If I create–or acquire via a fair transaction–a basket, I own that basket. It is not communal property.  I can make use of the basket for my own purposes, of my own accord.  It is “mine”, and thus “private property” in the modern sense of the term, though not under the Marxian definition (as I’m not using it to exploit anyone).  Hence Marx’s exhortation to eliminate “private property” in no way undermines individual autonomy (or contravenes personal prerogative), nor does it preclude exchange between willing parties (assuming there is no power / information asymmetry; and thus no domination / exploitation; nor any deception / fraud).}