The History Of Salafism I

After Al-Ghazali:

One of Al-Ghazali’s contemporaries was another Hanbali zealot: Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi…who was ALSO known for his unreflective hyper-traditionalism. {7}

Just like Al-Ghazali, Al-Maqdisi was fond of incorporating elements of Sufism into his virulent strain of Islam.  (He was smitten of the Qadiri brand of mysticism.)  It was another reminder that mysticism and fanaticism are not incompatible; and NEITHER has anything whatsoever to do with genuine spirituality.

And as with Al-Ghazali, Al-Maqdisi was afflicted with “takfiri” fervor; and held “bid’ah” and independent thinking in contempt.  Al-Maqdisi is famous for declaring: “There is nothing outside of Paradise but hellfire… There is nothing outside of the way of the Prophet but heretical innovation.”  He adamantly opposed any discussion of theological matters.  So far as he was concerned, supplicants were permitted only to repeat what was stated in the Koran and Hadith.  Period.  Anything further (commentary, inquiry, speculation) was forbidden.

Thus the through-line was carried on.  It makes sense, then, that Al-Maqdisi would be the primary inspiration for the 18th-century Arabian patriarch: Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab…who was also obsessed with “takfir”.

ALSO in the 12th century was a proselytizer in Baghdad named Abd al-Rahman [ibn Ali ibn Muhammad Abu al-Farash] ibn al-Jawzi.  And Al-Jawzi ALSO played an integral role in propagating the Hanbali creed.  His primary vocation was denouncing heretics in the public squares (i.e. upholding the practice of the “takfiris”).  His disdain for the liberalism of Mu’tazili thought was captured in his screed, “Talbis Iblis” [Delusions of Iblis; alt. the Devil’s Delusion].

In the 13th century, Kurdish (Shafi’i) theologian, Ibn al-Salah of Ardalan (Kurdistan) [later affiliated with Mosul] stated that philosophy is “the basis of foolishness and degeneration–a topic of confusion and misguidance, motivated by perversion and blasphemy.  Whoever engages in philosophy has been blinded to his insight into the great aspects of sharia that have been corroborated by evidence.”  It is not a big leap from this mindset to Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau: the notorious Nigerian Salafis leading “Boko Haram” [education is sinful]. {22}  Nor is it a big leap to the Taliban (who’s contempt for education is unsurpassed in the annals of human history).

It is plain to see how Ibn al-Salah’s take on Mohammedan lore underlay the thinking of modern-day stalwarts of a hyper-puritanical mentality–fanatics like, say, Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj and Sayyid Qutb. {23}  Indeed, there is a straight line from Ibn al-Salah to the likes of “mullah” Mohammed Omar (the Taliban)…and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (al-Qaeda)…and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (the Islamic State).

Ibn al-Salah was followed by yet another famed Reactionary: the Syrian (Hanbali) proselyte, Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah of Harran.  Ibn Taymiyyah was not a sophisticated thinker; he was a simple-minded, acerbic evangelizer.  Like any other outspoken zealot, he was somewhat of a rabble-rouser; and had nothing but disdain for anything resembling philosophy.

Ibn Taymiyyah is most known for being the author of the “Aqidah Al-Wasitiyyah” [Creed of the People of Wasit, Mesopotamia]–which, centuries later, would serve as the handbook for Wahhabism.  Like Al-Ghazali and Ibn al-Salah before him, Ibn Taymiyyah was renown for his disdain for any and all intellectual activity–which he denounced as “bid’ah” (innovation).  As he saw it, thinking for oneself was the ultimate transgression against god.  (Doing so was, after all, tantamount to a lack of submission; and so was–by definition–a repudiation of “Islam” ITSELF.)  The notion that spiritual enlightenment might take precedence over obedience to sharia was, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, born of a failure to follow the “Sunnah” (that is: the example of MoM).  Technically, he was correct in this assessment.  (Though for those of us who value probity, this is considered a BAD thing.)

As with the 7th-century Kharijites (as well as the 11th-century Al-Ghazali), Ibn Taymiyyah was obsessed with the concept of “takfir”–that is: prosecution against insufficiently devout Muslims (who were seen as de facto apostates; i.e. not REALLY Muslims).  Hence, so far as he saw it, it was the duty of all Muslims to oppose–and even kill–ostensibly Muslim rulers who did not implement sharia outright.  As we’ll see, this obsession with apostasy WITHIN the Ummah would play a dominant role in the internecine feuds of the Muslim world for well over a thousand years.

It should come as no surprise, then, that Ibn Taymiyyah was a primary influence on men like Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi, Hassan al-Banna, and–of course–Sayyid Qutb.  That’s not all; his rantings could be found on the bookshelves of Osama bin Laden / Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Abu Musad al-Zarqawi, as well as the leader of “Daesh”: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The Salafi thread continued.  Ibn Taymiyyah would be followed by another Hanbali fanatic: the Mamluk proselytizer, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah of Damascus.  Al-Jawziyyah continued to advocate for the most draconian policies of persecution against anyone who was seen as straying from the Sunnah.  He was also notorious for encouraging the practice of torture–not merely of prisoners, but of suspects.  In other words, he argued that anyone MERELY ACCUSED of blasphemy should be subjected to severe punishment.  He justified this by citing the example of MoM, who had employed the same practices.  This modus operandi put the Vatican’s “Inquisition” to shame.

By the High Renaissance in Europe, “the gates of ijtihad [independent thinking / reasoning]” were declared to be “CLOSED” by most of the world’s ulema.  This was in keeping with the original Mohammedan vision.  Recall that the mantra of the Salaf was: “la hukma illa li-llah” [judgement belongs to god alone]; which is essentially the antithesis of Immanuel Kant’s “Sapere Aude!”  As with the asseverations of the likes of Al-Ghazali, the message was: Don’t you DARE think for yourself.

It is telling that there was no word for “philosophy” in medieval Arabic.  Muslims were forced to adopt (a variation of) the Greek term–crudely rendered “falsafa”.  (See the Appendix for an in-depth exploration of the buzz-term, “ilm”.)

Just as the European Enlightenment (a process of secularization) was gathering steam, the so-called “Golden Age” of Islam had been snuffed out by a surfeit of religious zeal.  The former was the result of people emancipating themselves from religiosity; the latter was the result of people further ensconcing themselves in religiosity.

Dar al-Islam was drowning in a dogmatic quagmire.

Fast-forward to the 18th century: An ambitious (Hanbali) revivalist from the Najd named Muhammad [ibn Sulayman] ibn Abd al-Wahhab peddled his puritanical vision for Islam (a return to the ways of the exalted Salaf) across Arabia.  His execrable pact with the House of Saud occurred in 1744, thereby ensuring a theocracy that continues to the present day.  (That occurred over three decades before the American Revolution.  George Washington was twelve years old.)  In making the pact, Al-Wahhab stated: “I want you to grant me an oath that you will perform jihad against the non-Muslims.  In return, you will be leader of the Muslim community, while I will be the authority in religious matters.”

The Enlightenment was in full swing.  And instead of David Hume, Diderot, and Voltaire…Arabia was getting a religious fanatic afflicted with megalomania.  (Note: Wahhabism does not call itself “Wahhabism”; its adherents simply fashion it as the REAL ISLAM.)

To be clear: Wahhabism was a REVIVALIST movement (that is: the opposite of reformist).  This makes sense; because it was nothin new.  Al-Wahhab saw what he was doing as a kind of PURIFICATION of the Faith, not as some bold new innovation.  He was not seeking to move anything forward; he was bringing things back to square one.  This was made loud and clear in his diatribes: “Book of the Unity of God” [“Kitab al-Tawhid”] and “Book of the Koran” [“Kitab al-Qur’an”].

As it happened, Al-Wahhab lifted most of his convictions from the famed 12th-century Hanbali hard-liner, Al-Maqdisi (who–as we saw–equated any / all inquiry with blasphemy).  A fan of stoning adulterers, he worked diligently to revitalize “takfiri” fervor.  He was quick to denounce ANYONE who was not perfectly pious–dismissing even fellow People of the Book (Jews and Christians) as “mushrikun” (those who commit idolatry); and thus HERETICS deserving of punishment.

Tellingly, a contemporary Hanbali cleric named Ibn Fayruz of the Banu Tamim referred (not inaccurately) to the Wahhabis as “Kharijites”. (!)  As we’ve seen, this was for good reason: The Wahhabi creed was–after all–an exact reiteration of the Khariji creed from the 7th century.  This observation was soon echoed by the Hanafi scholar, Ibn Abidin of Damascus–who noted that Wahhabism was a modern version of the Khawarij.

It’s worth mentioning one more important figure.  In the early 19th century, the Indian revivalist, Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi attempted to establish an Islamic State in Peshawar and across the Punjab.  He was fashioned “Amir al-Mu-minin” [Commander of the Faithful] by his massive following.  (To put this in historical perspective, that was when James Monroe then John Quincy Adams were U.S. presidents.)  Though he was ultimately unsuccessful, Barelvi’s strident calls for “jihad” (and demand for a theocratic imamate) set a precedent in the region that reverberate to today–especially amongst the Pashtun people.

Modern-day Salafism:

In the early 20th century, Progressive Uzbek writer, Hamza Hakim-zade Niyazi was stoned to death for his (secular) views on women’s rights and social equality.  This was not some bizarre anomaly.  Such liberal advocacy offended Islamic sensibilities; as any pro-democratic stance was antithetical to the Sunnah; and inimical to traditional conceptions of “sharia”.

One of the most apt case-studies of Salafism in its modern-day incarnation is Sayyid Qutb–a man who had never before been persecuted / oppressed (that is, prior to his imprisonment due to his involvement in the attempted assassination of Nasser in 1954).  Nevertheless, he sought to wage war against “the West”.  Why?  Not because people in American suburbia were hurting him.  Rather, it was because they were living what he saw as a PRURIENT–and thus heretical–lifestyle (that is: a “din” not in keeping with the Sunnah).

This sentiment was not unheard of in Dar al-Islam–a fact most explicitly attested to by the Syrian proselytizer, Mohamed Rashid Rida (d. 1935), who had founded the immensely influential Salafi periodical, “The Lighthouse”.  When Qutb wrote “In the Shadow of the Koran” and “Milestones” [alt. “Signposts”], he was not venturing into uncharted waters; he was invoking a legacy that went back to the Salaf…and continued on through “The Lighthouse”. 

In other words: Qutb was not articulating a newfangled ideology when he penned his screeds in the 1950’s.  At no point did he suggest that he was coming up with novel ideas; or proposing anything new.  He was under no illusion that he was in any way offering a theological vision theretofore unknown to the Ummah.

In his delusive rants, Qutb was merely excavating ideals that had been touted by the Salaf…and had, so far as he saw it, been sidelined by modernity.

Had MoM read Qutb’s “Signposts” (or, more accurately, had he had it read to him), he would certainly have approved.  Given this, Qutb was right about at least ONE thing: He was upholding the tenets proffered by the “Seal of the Prophets”.  Indeed, Qutb was well aware of the fact that he was not proposing some revolutionary “new take” on the Sunnah.  He was, after all, a revivalist through and through.  In other words: He was vociferously seeking to REVERSE Reforms, not to Reform.

Suffice to say: The obtuse–and bizarrely acrimonious–thinking represented by Qutb and his 20th-century ilk was not some queer novelty of modern geo-politics.  The crucial points of “In the Shadow of the Koran” and “Signposts” held independently of the travails of British colonialism.  (Hence the need to parse the explanation for religious fundamentalism.  See footnote 18.)

In the 1960’s, Qutb exhibited nothing but scorn for philosophy and reform, echoing the deranged thinking of the Salafi precedent-setters we’ve discussed.  He had nothing but disdain for those in the Ummah who had come to elevate Reason to the same status as Revelation.  And he resented the fact that Dar al-Islam had recently developed affinities for the “foreign mold of philosophy”, as he put it.  In calling philosophy a “mold”, Qutb clearly missed the point of “philosophy”–speaking of it as if it were an alternative doctrine: set in stone for all eternity.

The legacy of Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah had not died.  It was alive and well.

To suggest that Salafism began in 1928 with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood [“Ikhwan al-Muslimeen”] in Egypt (not to be confused with the antecedent “Ikhwan” of Arabia discussed earlier) is to fail to see that Hassan al-Banna’s movement was REVIVALIST–which means there was something he was aiming to REVIVE.  While one of the (ostensive) concerns of the movement was anti-Imperialism (the meddling of “Western” powers in Muslim lands), the group was vehemently against civil rights (esp. with regards to women’s rights) for explicitly religious reasons.  Hassan al-Banna did not invent the notion of the “Salaf”.  He was not concocting new harebrained initiatives; he was feverishly reading Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah, thus following long-established precedent.

When Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi founded “Jamaat-i Islami” in Pakistan in 1941, he was not venturing into uncharted territory.  Like all revivalists before him, he was simply trying to bring Islam back to its roots.  He was not offering a “new take” on the Sunnah.  Nor was he conjuring never-before-seen ideas out of thin air.  He was seeking to resume a tradition that dated back to the 7th century.

Indeed, it was Maududi who inspired Muhammad Zia ul-Haq–the notorious general–to introduce the programatic (and draconian) “sharia-ization” to Pakistan.  (Zia ul-Haq had participated in the genocide against the Bengal population of then “East Pakistan” during the latter’s move for independence; though that was primarily due to racism rather than due to “takfiri” fervor.)  It was THAT “sharia-ization” which set the stage for the notorious “Haqqani” network of madrasahs in Waziristan; and paved the way for the Taliban.

It is important to note that Maududi’s cause did not emerge ex nihilo.  And his frenetic proselytization did not occur in a vacuum; as he was in close correspondence with the founder of Egypt’s “Muslim Brotherhood”, Hassan al-Banna (as well as Al-Banna’s lieutenant, Said Ramadan).  These instances of fanaticism were not isolated incidents.

Eventually, Maududi had a falling-out with the fundamentalist “Jamaat Ulema-i Hind” (another popular organization in the region) due to the latter’s tentative embrace of pluralistic policies.  PLURALISM, so far as he understood, was something to be repudiated.  Indeed, tolerance of heretical thought was diametrically opposed to the Salafi conception of “sharia”: a scheme that demanded unyielding dominion (in which all people were forcibly subordinated to Islamic rule).

It is not for nothing that the primary perpetrator of the Bengal genocide (the Pakistani cynosure, Ghulam Azam) was influenced by Maududi’s teachings…which were, in turn, based on the deeds of MoM himself (with prodigious scriptural backing).  Maududi’s charge was to revive the Islam of the Salaf; there was no need to create it.

In 1975, a Pakistani acolyte of Al-Wahhabi founded “Tanzeem-e Islami”, a militant Salafi organization that was an off-shoot of “Jamaat-e Islami” (which had been founded in the 1940’s).  He fashioned himself a REVIVALIST, not a reformer.  His personal mentor should not come as a surprise: Maududi.

A simple question might be posed: Why the contempt for education century after century after century?  The answer is plain to see: Salafism has always been predicated on holding REAL “ilm al-kalam” (ostensibly: rational discourse; free inquiry) in contempt.  The only “ilm” that actually matters to Salafis–ever since the Salaf themselves–is the “ilm” of the “Recitations” (that is: the word of god; not actual knowledge).  The earliest Mohammedans would agree; Al-Qadir would agree; Ibn Anas would agree; Al-Ghazali would agree; Al-Jawzi would agree; Ibn al-Salah would agree; Ibn Taymiyyah would agree; Al-Jawziyyah would agree; Al-Wahhab would agree; Al-Maqdisi would agree; and–eventually–the likes of Maududi and Qutb would agree as well.  Every one of these men was–more than anything else–a re-constructionist of early Islam.

To the present day, the House of Saud routinely persecutes–and often executes–those who exercise free speech.  Nobel Peace Prize nominee, Raif Badawi, who was imprisoned for simply speaking his mind, is but one of many examples (ref. his blog “Free Saudi Liberals”).  As we’ve seen, this was not a departure from Islamic precedent.  Writers in Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc. are regularly killed for heresy–a practice that is entirely in keeping with Mohammedan precedent.  Recall that MoM prescribed murder for anyone who expressed dissent–as explicated in, say, Bukhari’s Hadith (vol. 5, no. 369).  When we see Saudi monarchs lash and imprison civil rights activists for the “crime” of writing a blog, the Salaf’s take on the “Sunnah” is alive and well.

The history of Salafi thought is clear.  It was a bulwark AGAINST progress.

So Where Does That Leave Us?

A Reactionary mindset prevents us from being able to recognize what makes revanchist Islam CONSERVATIVE and what makes forward-thinking Islam LIBERAL.  This is why so many Islamic apologists are compelled to say that Salafis are “hijacking” the religion–a craven non-diagnosis that gets us nowhere.

So far as the aforementioned Salafi icons go, one can–indeed–fault Reactionary Muslims for many things; but failing to hew closely enough to Koranic dictates is not one of them.  Nor can Salafis be accused of not following the example of MoM.  Daesh taking sex slaves is nothing new.  Saudi monarchs decapitating heretics is nothing new.  Such practices have been de rigueur since day one.  CEASING them would be the true innovation.

New (read: Reformist) thinking would enable us to see that the answers to these important questions have largely to do with the treatment of Islam’s sacred scriptures: Reactionary Islam has one kind of relationship with the Koran and Hadith; a Reform Islam has an altogether different kind of relationship with the same texts.  THAT is the pivotal difference that makes all the difference.  The texts don’t change; only the TREATMENT OF the texts can change.

Those who fail to see that Salafism is alive and well throughout the Muslim world today must ignore the routine executions / assassination and imprisonment of innocent people (journalists, artists, commentators) for the crime of blasphemy in nations like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh…as well as they myriad Al-Qaeda and Daesh affiliates around the world.

Even in Indonesia, normally the go-to country for Progressives seeking an exemplar of liberal Islam, Hizb ut-Tahrir is alive and well.  In May 2017, an otherwise well-respected governor (Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama) was imprisoned simply for saying–during his campaign the preceding September–that Muslim fundamentalists who cited scripture to support the view that Christians should not hold high office were being deceitful.  The problem with this statement is that it is patently false.  The Koran (4:141, 5:8, and 5:51) as well as various Hadith are very clear on the point that non-Muslims (dhimmis) must never be allowed to hold power over Muslims.  It’s not that the protestors were wrong about Ahok’s erroneous citation; it’s that they were wrong to agree with what Islamic scripture says on the matter.

What is extremely concerning about such a drastic reaction was that, rather than simply correct a well-meaning yet incorrect statement, Indonesians rallied to have Ahok imprisoned for blasphemy.  In sum: The problem was not that the Salafis were being deceitful.  (They were actually being perfectly honest.)  The problem was that they were being theocratic.

The point is worth repeating: Reform is not about what Islam used to be, it’s about what it CAN be.  Reform is forward-looking, not backward-looking.  It is aspirational, not atavistic.  It is about being revolutionary rather than Reactionary.  Dwelling on the past is not going to solve any problems.

It is plain to see that there has been a continuity of fundamentalist thinking from the inception of Islam.  There is–indubitably–a common thread that runs from the Salaf, through the Middle Ages, up to the present day.  So if one wants to understand Islam HISTORICALLY, don’t look to exceptional men like Avicenna or Averroës; look to the likes of Ibn Anas, Al-Qadir, Al-Ghazali, Al-Jawzi, Ibn al-Salah, Ibn Taymiyyah, Al-Jawziyyah, Al-Wahhab, Al-Maqdisi, et. al.  Such men were bellwethers, not anomalies.  The few felicitous exceptions prove the lamentable rule.  (Rumi and his ilk were never authoritarian or puritanical…let alone hidebound ideologues.)

Even in 2004, when mullahs–and even a few bona fide scholars–from across the Middle East came together in Jordan to compose the (anti-takfiri) “Amman Message”, it was clear that they were going against the grain.  What grain?  Well, a grain that had existed since the 7th century.  They were undertaking their laudable endeavor in the name of diplomacy rather than in an effort to prevent heresy.

Noticeably absent from the plea was an enjoinder for jihadists to read the Koran more diligently, or entreaties to more strictly abide by the Sunnah. For the signatories knew full well that such an approach would be counter-productive, as it has always been.  Had the “takfiri” precedent that they were so assiduously denouncing never before had precedent, there would have been no need for them to do what they did.  It was for good reason they did not make their case by pleading with Muslims around the world to more stringently hew to the guidelines set out in scripture; as they were aware that doing so what make the problem WORSE.

Rather than (disingenuously) notifying the militants that they’d completely made everything up from whole-cloth, or that the militants were hijacking Islam, or that Muslims have never done anything like that before, the authors of the Amman Message opted for a different tac.  The gist of the declaration was: We do not endorse this (traditional) approach to “jihad”; as this is not who we are ANYMORE. 

Tellingly, nowhere in the document were the authors inclined to demand the militants refer to ANY of the icons of Islamic fundamentalism enumerated here.  Such abstention was for reasons that should now be blindingly obvious.  Instead, the document sought to revamp the Salafi version of Islam–primarily by promoting the “Ashari” take on “ilm al-kalam” (that is: Greek philosophy-infused Islamic theology).

But here’s the thing: “Ashari” Islam PER SE has little to do with which version of the Faith any given Muslim opts to espouse.  The Ashari approach adheres to the Shafi’i “madhhab”–a jurisprudential approach that, though associated with Salafi icon, Al-Ghazali, is not the go-to “madhhab” (school of jurisprudence) for most Salafis.  (The Shafi’i approach to “fiqh” is recognized by Muslims primarily on the African Horn…as well as in Kurdistan, Chechnya, and south-east Asia.)  And while many Salafi icons have been Hanbalis, most Salafis NOW subscribe to the Hanafi “madhhab”.

In any case, championing the Shafi’i approach to “fiqh” is no guarantee of liberalism–as fanatics like Al-Ghazali attest.  In any case, the Shafi’i theologian, Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn Isma’il al-Ashari of Basra (late 9th / early 10th century), founder of the “Ashari” denomination, was no model for reform–let alone a stalwart of liberalized Islam.  He was, after all, militantly opposed to the (more liberal) Mu’tazili school.

In the “Amman Message”, there was also an emphasis placed on the “aqidah” [creed] associated with Samanid (Persian) theologian, Muhammad Abu Mansur al-Maturidi of Samarkand–a revered Hanafi scholar from the late 9th / early 10th century.  While most Salafis TODAY are–indeed–Hanafis, Maturidis are primarily Turkic and East Asian; and so not the main target audience for the declaration. (!)  Appealing to Al-Maturidi to sway the thinking of Salafis is like trying to sway the thinking of Hassidim by appealing to Maimonides.  (Shall we also encourage reform amongst American Pentecostals by citing the Bohemian radical, Jan Hus?  Shall we bring Jehovah’s Witnesses to their senses via appeals to John Wycliff?  Or perhaps we might disabuse American Dominionist’s by quoting Martin Luther King Jr.)  Ideologues become stuck in their mindset precisely because they refuse to heed the insights of anyone who is NOT cloistered within their worldview.  That’s what makes Reactionary thinking Reactionary: it is inherently parochial.

The Amman declaration then laid out the conditions for issuing valid edicts [“fatwas”].  The authors did so, however, according to their own standards…which were not the standards that are historically salient to militant Salafis.  Such standards may be reasonable, but they are not the standards that were set by the Salaf…which is the entire point of being Salafi!  One may as well try to persuade a vegan to become a carnivore by pointing out that eating meat requires killing animals.  One can’t invoke the standards that one’s audience has already rejected to cajole them into engaging in activities based on those standards.

Enjoinders to liberalize Islam are all well and good; but this particular document seemed to gloss over the root causes of the problems it deigned to address.  Be that as it may, it was telling that at no point did the Amman declaration’s signatories pretend that the problematic version Islam had come out of thin air.  For surely the authors were all aware that religious fundamentalism had a long history.

Nevertheless, the document’s wording allowed for the TACIT assumption that everything had been hunky-dory all along (since the time of the Sahabah); and only recently have a handful of wayward fanatics sabotaged the Faith–thereby tainting an otherwise immaculate record.  This is not only factually false; it entirely misses the point at hand. {27}  One cannot leverage genuine Reform on an illusory fulcrum.  While this concession may have given the document rhetorical ballast, it elided that which needed to be confronted head on.

Odious figures like Sayyid Abd al-Maududi and Sayyid Qutb espoused a hyper-puritanical “din” (way of life), replete with a purist “akhlaq” (moralism / etiquette).  We mustn’t lose sight of the fact that their ideological bent was consummate with the Sunnah as originally conceived.  Such men enslaved their minds in order to sustain their delusion; and then worked assiduously to enslave others’ minds in order to promulgate that delusion. {28}  Recognizing this fact does not detract from the fact that what they were doing was nothing new.

Indeed, none of these men were doing anything novel.  They were simply reaffirming the way Islam used to be.  They were–one and all–well aware that “Islam” means “SUBMISSION”, not critical inquiry.  They sacrificed their dignity (“karama”) on the alter of Faith (“iman”); and proceeded accordingly.

In trying to envision a Reform Islam, it is important to understand that such Islamic icons were not inventing their doctrines from whole-cloth.  These men were not innovative thinkers; they were hyper-traditionalists.  They were re-constructionists–which is to say: the OPPOSITE of revolutionaries.  They may have been fanatics; but iconoclasts they most certainly were not.  To dismiss them as historical aberrations is to misunderstand how Islam actually existed over the centuries; and WHY it existed as such.

Salafism (including its Saudi variant, Wahhabism) is an atavism, not an innovation.  The preachments of Al-Ghazali and his ilk reverberate to this day in the rantings of myriad fundamentalist organizations.  Even during the past generation, we have seen residual signs of Islam’s odious legacy; as with Omar Abd al-Rahman (a.k.a. “Abdul Rahman”; a.k.a. the “Blind Sheik”), alumnus of Al-Azhar University’s celebrated PhD program in theology.  Al-Azhar’s department is not a fringe operation; it is Dar al-Islam’s preeminent venue for Koranic studies. {11}

When evaluating the thinking of Islamic fundamentalists TODAY, we must bear in mind that the ideological underpinnings of their zealotry did not emerge–as if from the aether–in recent times.  It has been operative since the inception of Islam.  Salafism is not an adverse side-effect of Western colonialism / imperialism, nor is it some weird byproduct of geo-politics in the modern era.  It has been there all along; and is ANIMATED by such exigencies. {29}

As we’ve seen, the pattern has been consistent since the 7th century: A seething contempt for intellectual curiosity (and for anything that challenged the dogmatic edifice that had been erected).  There is nothing revolutionary about Reactionary thinking; and it is Reactionary thinking that has held sway over the majority of Islam’s sordid history.  A handful of estimable figures does not make the rogue’s gallery of fundamentalists magically disappear.  It is far more the latter, not the former, who characterized the grand sweep of Islamic history–a fact that informs how we might work to make things different going forward.

Our inquiry now brings us to a pertinent question: What major historical developments did this reprobate theological legacy beget?  In part two of this series, we will look at the geo-political impact of Salafism since its inception in the 7th century.