The History Of Salafism I

Footnotes

{1  We must be cautious with amorphous qualifiers like “radical” (and “extreme” and “drastic”).  It helps to get our terminology straight.  This requires consistency.  Worthwhile nomenclature is simply a matter of using otherwise “loaded” terms in the same way we would use them in virtually any other context–thereby UN-loading them, as it were.  Fundamentalism–the signature trait of the hidebound ideologue–involves a need to CONFORM and a bent toward hyper-traditionalism (of one sort or another).  Progressivism, on the other hand, involves some kind of departure from the established order (which invariably entails contravening “received wisdom” in some non-trivial way).  Put another way: The hallmark of reactionary thinking is obstinately sticking with the “traditional” way of doing–and thinking about–things.  By stark contrast, the prime feature of revolutionary thinking is a radical departure from convention.  Radicalism, then, is the antithesis of fundamentalism.  Indeed, in ALL contexts, radicalism connotes some kind of significant incongruity with what has (heretofore) normally been the case.  That is to say, radicalism is an endeavor to countermand traditionalist tendencies (and thus challenge incumbent power structures)…as opposed to an obsessive effort to uphold “traditional” tenets.  Hence there is nothing “radical” about Salafism / Wahhabism vis a vis Islam.  The only thing radical about Islamic fundamentalism is its divergence from the basic principles of civil society–something that GENUINE radicals often seek to abet.  (For examples, see footnote 10 below.)}

{2  For Muslims sincerely looking to disabuse themselves of mis-impressions about the history of their religion, a prudent starting-point would be its putative founder, MoM himself.  Erroneous narratives abound whenever HEROIC folkloric figures are at issue.  A plethora of embellished tales surrounds most such figures; but, for any given subject, only one account is grounded in the historical record: the account closest to Truth.}

{3  …or European fascism from Roman Catholicism…or the Judean Settler movement from Orthodox Judaism…or Scientology from L. Ron Hubbard’s “Sea Org”.  While we’re at it, we could suppose that the World Bank and IMF have never had anything to do with corporate interests.  Certain obvious connections seem to escape many of us.  It occurs to surprisingly few to connect the high costs of healthcare with the existence of medical insurance companies and America’s privatized sickness-treatment industry; or volatility, instability, and speculation-fueled bubbles with the hyper-financialization / hyper-privatization of the economy.  Such disassociation is easy insofar as we don’t want to connect a universally-recognized problem with something we personally fancy.  That much of what is discussed here is so controversial, or even requires pointing out, is indicative of the widespread senescence (nay, intellectual blight) with which we are contending.  That many Muslims would find much of what is written in the present work surprising shows us much of what is wrong with the current state of affairs.  Insofar as people need to hide history (or deny facts), they reveal the illusory nature of their ideology.}

{4  It might be noted that one of Averroës’ better-known works was “The Decisive Treatise”, in which he argued for the emancipation of science and philosophy from Islamic theology.  This position was diametrically opposed to that of Al-Ghazali, who sought to subordinate any/all thought–especially anything gleaned from Dar al-Kufr–to Islamic theology.}

{5  Today, it is quite telling that Al-Ghazali’s anti-intellectual drivel is found in madrasahs far more often than is anything by either Averroës or Ibn Tufayl.  (Avicenna is downright unheard of.)  Given how often he is still extolled amongst Islamic apologists, Al-Ghazali is only remarkable for how UN-remarkable he was.  To suppose that Al-Ghazali was a great thinker–or even a halfway decent thinker–is a slap in the face to all of history’s great thinkers (and an insult to those of us who have taken the time to study them).  There are a few luminaries from the Muslim world worth revering; Al-Ghazali is not one of them.}

{6  Al-Ghazali served as inspiration for a few medieval CHRISTIAN apologists–most notably 13th-century Dominican friars, Ramon Marti (Catalan) and Thomas Aquinas (Sicilian).  He also provided some inspiration to the Jewish commentator, Maimonides.}

{7  He is not to be confused with the 10th-century Palestinian geographer, Muhammad ibn Ahmad Shams al-Din al-Maqdisi.  Our subject is often referred to as “Ibn Qudamah” instead (to avert this conflation).}

{8  For more on the history of Islam with respect to other Faiths, one might consult “Seeing Islam As Others Saw It: A Survey and Evaluation of Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian Writings On Early Islam” by Robert G. Hoyland.  Also see Hoyland’s work on the early Islamic State.}

{9  He is not to be confused with his descendent: the famed Shafi’i theologian, Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari of Basra, who lived in the late 9th / early 10th century, and was the namesake of the Ashari denomination.}

{10  Jesus of Nazareth was a radical.  Thomas Paine was a radical.  Emmeline Pankhurst was a radical.  Martin Luther King Jr. was a radical.  In a religious context, Baruch-cum-Benedict Spinoza and Uriel da Costa were radicals (critics of Judaic dogmatism)…while Jacob Ettlinger (bellwether for Orthodox Judaism) was not.  Jan Hus and John Wycliff (bellwethers for the Christian Reformation) were radicals…while Tomas de Torquemada and John Calvin were not.  Within the Roman Catholic Church, radicalism is what led to Liberation Theology.  So Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab was the OPPOSITE OF a radical, as were the rest of the Salafi icons adumbrated in this survey.  Daesh and the Taliban are no more “radical” than the Vatican’s curia.  Revivalists aren’t radicals; they are revanchists.  Retrogression is not a bold act; it is an act of moral–and intellectual–dereliction.}

{11  We might contrast “Blind Sheik” Abd al-Rahman to a more Reformist-minded alumnus of the same institution: the scholar, Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963).  What is it that made these two men so different?  One hewed to the Salafi vision of Islam; the other DEPARTED from it.}

{12  It is quite clear that Al-Ghazali did not glean anything of note from the SUBSTANCE of Aristotle’s writings (spec. “Politics” and “Nicomachean Ethics”).  Indeed, the religious zealot was obviously unconcerned with Aristotle’s views on civil society (re: meritocracy, individual liberties, etc.)  Aristotle was against marginalizing anyone; and was adamant that the commonweal (esp. universal enfranchisement) was the primary concern of governance.  Moreover, Aristotle’s conditions for virtue had nothing whatsoever to do with religious affiliation (i.e. worshiping the right deity, or ANY deity for that matter).  Al-Ghazali was merely inspired by how PERSUASIVE Aristotle was; and how adroit he was with employing this powerful thing, rigorous logic, that was so foreign to the Muslim world.}

{13  In the ancient Muslim world, the closest we find to “ilm al-kalam” as “knowledge” in the modern sense was the Mu’tazili school of thought (8th to 10th centuries).  Mu’tazilites held that morality was not determined by revealed scripture (or even by attempts to “interpret” scripture), but via unsullied reasoning.  In other words, they broke with conventional Mohammedan thought and contended that “ilm al-kalam” (in their conception: GENUINE knowledge) can only be derived from Pure Reason.  Consequently, reason (rather than the dictates of sacred texts) was seen as the “final arbiter” in distinguishing right from wrong.  Predictably, the Mu’tazila movement was wiped out.  As with most religious dominion, those who dare to think for themselves (esp. in ways that don’t comport with accepted norms) end up paying a steep price.  The irony is that Mu’tazili rulers were THEMSELVES guilty of persecuting people who disagreed with them.  Be that as it may, glimmers of a Reformist approach could be seen in the Mu’tazila movement.  It should serve as a reminder, though, that rationalism is not enough; pluralism is imperative.  This is a cautionary tale as much as it is an example to be emulated.}

{14  The point bears repeating: In Islamic theology, the term “ilm” must be taken with a hefty grain of salt.  Recall that, within Islamic theology, being “in the know” has traditionally been counterpoised against “jahiliyya” [a state of ignorance].  Hence Dar al-Kufr is commonly referred to as “jahiliyya” (as was pre-Islamic Arabia).  According to this taxonomy, “ignorance” was equated with impiety–as the only kind of ignorance worth talking about was ignorance of the Sunnah.  Thus, ignorance (lack of “ilm”) is equated with impiety (lack of “iman”).  In other words: “ilm” is effectively a euphemism for “proper thinking” (i.e. “heeding of the Sunnah”).  It is, then, NOT a term for what we’d refer to as (genuine) “knowledge” in the post-Enlightenment era.  This is similar to the malleable usage of “hikma” [wisdom] in Islamic theology.  The catch is: What an ideological movement deems to be “wisdom” is whatever its impresarios proclaim it to be (i.e. that which accords with the designated creed).  Thus: “If you agree with US, then you have wisdom.”  The problem is that once “knowledge” / “wisdom” is equated with “awareness of–and fealty to–the sacred doctrine”, it becomes entirely relativistic, and thus utterly meaningless (just as with, say, “seeing the light” and adhering to the “straight path”).  In sum: When it comes to theology, such buzz-terms are entirely question-begging.  Theology is not a form of epistemology; it is an avoidance of it.}

{15  Ergo an arbitrary statute of limitations on salvation.  Presumably, this age was designated because that is how old MoM was when he (purportedly) received his first revelation.  (Therefore, the thinking goes, if one hasn’t “gotten it” by that point in life, one has–as it were–missed the boat.)  Such obvious confabulation is not an aberration.  ALL theology, we should bear in mind, is simply the product of people simply making stuff up.  Others eventually come to believe it or not.  When the tenet “sticks”, it is thereafter taken as sacred doctrine.  As the disputations in 4th-century Rome demonstrated (with respect to determining official Catholic doctrine), those with the most power tend to dictate what is taken as gospel and what is deemed heretical.  But this is a function of institutional power, not of special insight.  As Michel Foucault noted, what often passes as “knowledge” is merely a reflection of power structures.  And as the revamped “golden rule” says: “Those with the gold make the rules.”  The rabble tend to acquiesce to this…out of pure pragmatism.  However, many acquiesce due to what is sometimes called “social institutionalism”–the theory that institutionalized norms tend to trump rational deliberation.  Only those with Kantian “courage” / “maturity” overcome this predisposition.  Imagine telling someone after their 40th birthday (who sincerely aims to improve himself): “Sorry; that ship has sailed.  Too late.  You’re screwed.”  Only the most potent indoctrination could possibly convince someone that this was a reasonable thing to believe.  “Dawah” only for those under 40 insinuates that humane-ness stops at middle-age; and that the elderly are a lost cause.  This makes perfect sense, though, if the primary concern is promulgating a cult.  After all, when evangelizing, why waste time on those who are older than 40 when they are weak and will die soon anyway?}

{16  The vehemently anti-Isma’ili “khawaja”, Abu Ali Hasan ibn Ali of Tus (a.k.a. “Nizam al-Mulk”), was the Persian vizier of the Seljuk Empire during much of the 11th century.  He was himself somewhat of a pseudo-scholar.  He wrote the “Siyasat-nama” [Book on Government] in which he conducted a (shoddy) historical survey of alternate forms of government from the past.  He is best known for having a series of “Nezamiyyahs” (institutions of higher learning) constructed around Persia.  Yet these were little more than theology schools; hardly the sort of institutions that were renown at Oxford, England and at Bologna, Italy.  It is for this reason that Al-Ghazali is commonly associated with Nishapur in Khorasan rather than with his native land, Tus.}

{17  A century and a half later, Thomas Aquinas would be influenced by Aristotle as well–as demonstrated by his own attempt to use rational argumentation to defend his Faith; and to concoct a religion-oriented virtue-ethics vis a vis Christianity.  Aquinas was even inspired by Al-Ghazali’s (hackneyed) attempt to undertake the same project vis a vis Islam.  The approach was as obsequious as it was daft: If science conflicted with sacrosanct religious dogmas (which were deemed inviolate), then the disjunction mustn’t be blamed on religiosity; it is our own epistemic short-comings.  Soon thereafter, scholastics like Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham were inspired by Aristotle as well.  There is a good reason that Aquinas, Bacon, Scotus, and William are taught in collegiate courses on Renaissance thought, while Al-Ghazali is not.  For, unlike these other expositors, Al-Ghazali was no fan of the scientific method; nor of critical inquiry.}

{18  Of course, not everything Al-Ghazali said was objectionable.  He reiterated the anti-materialism that had been propounded by Jesus of Nazareth–purportedly commenting: “You possess only what cannot be lost in a shipwreck” and “Men whose hearts are changed by money are not learned.”  Amen.  Felicitously, he was against avarice and ostentation (“riya”).  Yet for every tidbit of good advice, we encounter precious gems like, “Do not fix hopes on your health” and “Whoever refuses to marry sins against the purpose of Creation.”  Islamic apologists are so accustomed to romanticizing Al-Ghazali and his ilk that they will find the present critique of him uncharitable (to put it mildly).  But the aim here is not to be charitable; it is to be accurate. (See footnote 19 below.)  As for those who extol Al-Ghazali, I propose a question they might pose to themselves: What original idea did he have that lead to some significant improvement in human society?  I am unaware of any such idea.  Bottom line: We cannot fully understand Salafism without recognizing its historical underpinnings.  There is no need to exalt Islamic icons simply because they have traditionally been Islamic icons.  Progressively-inclined Muslims might keep this in mind when they concern themselves with physical health and opt to remain single / childless.}

{19  It’s not that I’m putting a negative spin on things.  I am simply counteracting the de rigueur POSITIVE spin usually encountered in Islamic apologia.  This act can, of course, be jarring to those accustomed to the usual spin.  Any “embellishment-dampening” effect will invariably come off as infelicitous to the True Believer.  The problem with Islamic apologia is that it expects commentary on delicate matters to be, above all else, validating (read: gratifying).  But the point of critical analysis is not to avoid discomfiture; it is to tell the truth.  A Muslim should have no more compunction acknowledging the checkered history of Islam than, say, a Christian has acknowledging the checkered history of Christianity.  One might ask: How is it that a Quaker has no qualms when the horrors of the Inquisition are pointed out?  Yes, the program of insidious tribunals was a blot on the legacy of their religion (Christianity-in-general); but they are resigned to it AS FACT, as they recognize that it had nothing to do with THEM.  Indeed, they understand that their Faith can, indeed, be something that has no connection whatsoever with Roman Catholic tyranny during the Middle Ages.}

{20  One of the better-known culprits on this score is the dean of Cambridge’s “Muslim College”, Timothy Winter–who was indoctrinated in Saudi Arabia, and refers to himself as “shaykh” Abdul Hakim Murad.  This is an example of how, in an agora super-saturated with dogmatism, even the dean of a college at an esteemed university like Cambridge can be a complete charlatan.  Winter’s fawning admiration for Al-Ghazali boarders on hero-worship.  This makes sense; as Al-Ghazali in the Middle Ages was of the same mind as Winter is today: “It’s fine to extract convenient tid-bits from other’s material (e.g. Ancient Antiquity) here and there…so long as it is compatible with my holy book.  However, the moment something is (seen to be) incompatible with the Koran, it must be rejected out of hand.”  In other words: Winter is little more than a hyper-dogmatist masquerading as a scholar (i.e. a shill for Islamic apologia).  Winter is evidently impressed by Al-Ghazali’s gem-mining expeditions into Ancient Greek philosophy.  Like his hero, he has no interest in learning anything; only in finding rationalizations for his own beliefs.  For revelation must ALWAYS trump Reason.  (Winter once did an interview in which he gushed about Al-Ghazali for half an hour, portraying the theologian as a fount of wisdom, yet neglected to mention even a single brilliant idea his hero may have offered.  He failed to do so for a simple reason: Al-Ghazali had no such ideas.)  There is a difference between marginally fanciful and outright delusional.  Men like Winter should not be allowed anywhere near students seeking to learn about the Koran (or about the history of Islam).  Presumably, Winter has never actually read any works of truly great philosophers (Spinoza or Hume or Kant or Paine or Schopenhauer or Mill or Kierkegaard or Nietzsche or Peirce or anyone else worth reading); and consequently hasn’t the faintest clue what such a work might actually look like.  I suspect he would have an aneurism were he to read the present essay.}

{21  Sufism, we often find, is a nebulous category; as it has an ethereal penumbra encompassing a potpourri of different Islamic traditions.  A whirling dervish in Turkey (who lauds Rumi, reads “nasheed”, and frequents non-halal cafes in Istanbul) is different from a Pashtun mystic spouting “dhikr” from a cave in the Hindu Kush.  There is no clear way to demarcate a Sufi with a penchant for fundamentalist Sunnism from a Salafist with a penchant for mysticism.  It might be noted that the Sufi strain of Islamic fundamentalism has most often existed within–though by no means has been limited to–the Naqshbandi order.}

{22  It might be noted that the official name for Boko Haram is “Jama’at” [Group / Party of] “Ahl as-Sunnah” [People of the Sunnah] “lid-Dawah wa’l-Jihad” [for Dawa and Jihad].  Here, “sunnah” means “teachings of MoM”, “dawa” means proselytization, and “jihad” means struggle.  All three elements here can be conceptualized in a myriad of ways–from benign to malign.  As the present survey shows, such terms have traditionally had a palpably militant connotation.  (See Appendix 1 at the end of part 2 of this essay.)  The point, though, is that this group of Salafis–as Salafis often do–explicitly defines itself as those strictly abiding by the Sunnah, and fashions itself as partaking in “dawa” as well as engaging in “jihad”, just as any devout Muslim should.  What’s going on here?  Indeed, their agenda seems to belie the rosy picture of “sunnah”, “dawa”, and “jihad” usually painted by ostensibly Progressive Islamic apologists.  Are these Nigerian militants simply making everything up?  Are they contriving heretofore unheard-of meanings to these key lexemes?  The lesson is that such amorphous buzz-terms (as with “sharia”, “fiqh”, “ilm”, “hikma”, “adaala”, “sawab”, “iman”, etc.) mean whatever votaries make them mean.  Indeed, such terms are almost infinitely malleable–as they are deliberately kept nebulous.  Ironically enough, wide hermeneutic berth is partly what makes genuine Reform possible.  It doesn’t follow from scripture’s semiotic malleability, though, that we get to concoct our own account of what such terms TRADITIONALLY meant.  Historical fact is, after all, historical fact.  The truth of the matter is: there HAS BEEN a clear precedent; and Boko Haram is, indeed, adhering to a well-known convention that can be traced back to the 7th century.  The historical record is incontrovertible on this.  The question for us today, then, is: Shorn of their baggage, what can these loaded words POTENTIALLY mean?}

{23  Recall that the primary grievance of Qutb’s “Stars of Guidance” [“Ma’alim fi al-Tariq”; typically translated as “Milestones”] was not Western imperialism / colonialism; it was a lack of (sufficiently stringent) sharia in governance; and a dearth of Islamic “din” in daily life.  While oriented TOWARD the political and social, the BASIS FOR his grievance was explicitly religious.  Moreover, Qutb’s primary focus–one might even say, his TARGET–was the MUSLIM world (spec. the Arab world), not the secular precincts of California and Colorado.}

{24  Note that Salafism and Wahhabism are often conflated, as they are both manifestations of fundamentalist Sunnism.  There is a convergence that sometimes occurs–as with the Haqqani network of madrasahs in Waziristan.  More often than not, though, Wahhabis don’t like to be considered Salafi (ask the House of Saud) and Salafis don’t like being affiliated with Wahhabism (ask Al-Nusra Front and other Al-Qaeda affiliates, who despise the House of Saud).  It should be noted, though, that these two kinds of Sunni fundamentalism are AT ROOT two versions of the same thing.  The House of Saud routinely funded–and overtly supported–the Muslim Brotherhood during its earliest decades; and the Muslim Brotherhood returned the praise during that time.  For simplicity, my use of “Salafism” is all-encompassing.  Note that Wahhabis typically do not explicitly refer to themselves as “Wahhabis” (though they recognize the eponymous patriarch of their movement); as they simply consider themselves the most authentic Muslims.  (By implication: all other denizens of Dar al-Islam are deemed to be of dubious authenticity.)  So far as they are concerned, this is the only way to categorize those who profess to be Muslim; so denominations are entirely beside the point.  That said, we mustn’t overlook the fact that Shiism has its own fundamentalist strain, which is every bit as deranged.}

{25  Note that “shahid” has two different connotations.  In some contexts, it can refer to a witness.  However, it usually means someone who is killed in the process of fighting–as explicated in Koran 3:141-143 / 169-170, 9:11, and 22:58.  Ibn Anas was clearly referring to the latter–in keeping with, say, Bukhari 4/52/54.  For more on the matter of “jihad” as a concept, and its role in Islamic history, see Appendix 1 at the end of part 2 of this essay.}

{26  Today, most of the available commentary on Al-Ghazali is extremely misleading.  As might be expected, the vast majority of the material of from those who are sympathetic to Salafism.  Such expositors pose as scholars, yet are nothing more than religious apologists; and they count on their audience not knowing any better.  Such charlatans range from Timothy Winter (a.k.a. “Abdal Hakim Murad”) to Mark Hanson (a.k.a. “Hamza Yusuf”).  (See footnote 20 above.)  The only (ostensibly) non-Muslim academic I found who white-washes this reprehensible figure is German professor, Frank Griffel of Yale University.  Lord knows what his motivation for doing so might have been.}

{27  Noble as their effort was, the signatories of the “Amman Message” seemed to miss what makes–and has always made–Salafism SALAFI.  Alas, their admirable entreaty likely fell on deaf ears–as they effectively stated: “This is OUR reading of the texts; so this is the version of Islam that we endorse.  We insist that you adopt THIS way of seeing things; because this way is best.”  Such a plea is, of course, question-begging.  For a Salafist will simply respond: “We don’t care what YOUR interpretation is.  We think you’re wrong.  That’s what makes us Salafi and you NOT Salafi.”  The target audience for the declaration should have been all the NON-fanatical denizens of the Ummah.  The document may have thus stated: “While admittedly this odious conduct is in keeping with many parts of the Sunnah, good Muslims REJECT those parts.  Only by doing so can we forge a new way forward.”}

{28  Note that these are not obscure crackpots that I extracted from history in a paroxysm of confirmation bias.  Far from being fringe figures, these are some of the most prominent–and influential–figures in the history of Islam.  The problematic “beta” factor (in this case, fundamentalist Islam) has been operative since the religion’s inception; what DOES change is the “alpha” factor (exigencies of the time and place).  What changed the MOST between the Middle Ages and the post-Renaissance era was the direction of hegemony (i.e. who the main culprit of imperialism happened to be).  Until the 15th century, Dar al-Islam was on the ascendency, and so was the primary perpetrator of empire.  (Mired in religionism, the Occident sunk into the Dark Ages shortly after the Vatican magisterium overtook Europe.  The fragmentation–and dissolution–of the Western Roman Empire promptly ensued.)  Since the High Renaissance (i.e. when secularity emerged as a force in Europe), it has been the Occident that’s been on the ascendency.  Consequently, Dar al-Kufr [domain of non-Muslims] ended up being the primary perpetrator of colonialism–as the Ummah, which continued to be mired in religionism, stagnated.  (See footnote 30 below.)  Those on the receiving end of imperialism (and thus colonialism) invariably become resentful and desperate; thereby creating the optimal incubator for cult activity (and right-wing ideology in general).  The lesson here is that “alpha” is always relevant.  Abiding ignorance, humiliation, and resentment, (along with perpetually-stoked neuroses and simmering rage) provided the ideal climate for the metastasization for a certain kind of religious fundamentalism.  In sum: Religiosity (beta) informs people how to frame–and then respond to–their circumstances (alpha).}

{29  There have been instances in which Salafism HAS been stoked by anti-colonialist fervor.  The Deobandi movement (born in the midst of the “Dar ul-Ulum” [House of Knowledge] movement in northeast India in the late 19th century) is an example of how religious zeal (read: fundamentalism) can be a reaction to colonialism (in this case: to the British colonialism in India, including Bengal-Kashmir-Pakistan-Afghanistan).  The same might be said of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine.  Far from being unprecedented (i.e. examples of novel approaches to the creed), these militant movements had recourse to doctrinal foundations that had been laid over twelve centuries earlier.  They were simply revisiting well-trodden paths.  It is no surprise, then, that the Deobandi movement has persisted long after its original charter became obsolete.  The Taliban’s existence cannot be attributed to Soviet incursion, especially since the movement’s heyday occurred after the Russians were long-gone; and it was concerned more with throwing acid in Muslimahs’ faces for improprieties than with ousting kuffar from the Hindu Kush.  Indeed, the doctrinal obsessions of the Haqani network existed irrespective of grievances about Russian encroachments or Western imperialism.  (The U.S. did not invade Afghanistan until the autumn of 2001; it was, in fact, ABETTING the regime until the attacks of September 11.)  Their ax to grind was illustrated by the destruction of ancient Buddhist statues–hardly a matter of anti-colonialism.  In sum: Deobandi Salafis have persecuted / slaughtered far more Muslims than non-Muslims–an indication that anti-colonialism was not their main concern.}

{30  While imperialism / colonialism invariably involves an iniquitous use of power; it is an indication of power nevertheless.  Indeed, the flourishing from which such power emerges is not generated ex nihilo.  Augmented secularity was at the root of flourishing (i.e. an increase in societal vitality) in the Occident.  Also note that the aforesaid process of secularization was put into overdrive during the Enlightenment.  This portended the liberalization responsible for the prodigious Occidental development–and the burgeoning of civil society–that came to pass in “the West” (primarily during the Industrial Revolution).  Brute power–for good or ill–was largely the result of the double-edge sword that was industrialization (a categorically secular phenomenon).  In any case, the Occident’s MIS-use of power (primarily in the form of imperialism / colonialism) fostered the very conditions that kept the Muslim world behind in the first place (conditions amenable to pervasive religiosity).  That is to say, the iniquities of “the West” (its leveraging of the advantages conferred upon it by the industrial revolution) perpetuated the power disparities between Occident and Orient, thereby stoking REACTION in the latter.  This only reinforced the abiding dysfunctions of the Muslim world…which, in turn, perpetuated (and even augmented) the power asymmetry.  It was a positive feedback loop (a.k.a. a vicious cycle).  Recognizing this does not require countenancing the divisive “Orientalism” rightly indicted by Edward Said.}

{31  Bear in mind: This survey does not pretend to be an exhaustive history of Islam.  It simply mentions salient points.  The result is a series of watershed moments that would presumably be included in any introductory class on the subject.  Here, I conduct the survey over the course of fourteen centuries, covering a massive geographical area (from Andalusia to Bengal); so I must use broad strokes.  Given such an extensive timespan and geographical expanse, the variegation of circumstances at every time and place cannot possibly be specified.  Nevertheless, a through-line can certainly be discerned.  The present essay is concerned with trends that run counter to the thesis that Islamic fundamentalism arose solely out of geo-political exigencies of the modern age.  The goal is to show how the fundamentalism we encounter today has clear roots in bygone eras.  Anomalies notwithstanding, the iconic figures discussed here were bellwethers, not fringe figures; so they are key reference points in a common thread that runs through Islam’s history.  The Salafi approach was baked into the cake from the beginning.  True Reformers recognize that it’s time to change the recipe.}

{32  The cosmopolitan center of Beirut, Lebanon would be an exemplar of pluralism in modern times (that is, up until the post-War era). Tehran, Iran was relatively secularized in the post-War era, though that mostly occurred in the context of POLITICAL illiberalism (i.e. despotic rule under the “Shah”).  In present-day Kyrgyzstan, we also find such harmony; a happy fact that can be attributed to the partial secularization of Kyrgyz culture.  Pursuant to the Kamal-ization of the country after the first World War, the same phenomenon occurred in Turkey.  Tunisia is also a beacon of liberalism in the Muslim world.  To a lesser degree, we’ve seen sporadic liberalization in other pockets (e.g. Kuala Lampur, Malaysia).  The absence of conflict throughout the Levant from the conclusion of the so-called “Crusades” (15th century) to the on-set of the Revisionist Zionist project (the “Nakbah” in 1947-48) can be attributed to the LACK OF an agenda on the part of Jews, Christians, and Muslims to force their respective creeds on the region.  During that period (almost half a millennium), barring intermittent skirmishes, people of the three Faiths lived peaceably side by side.  Such happy circumstances existed under a (somewhat pluralistic) Ottoman rule (see footnotes 34 and 35 below).  This relative harmony was not DUE TO incipient creedal / tribal fealties; but DESPITE them.  That is to say: This era of (quasi-)comity does not serve as evidence that any of those religions were pacifistic.  Rather, it shows that–for a time–other factors trumped any sectarian enmity (which may have lain dormant).  It was not religiosity that dissolved the antagonisms between the Faiths; it was a conscientious measure of democratic thinking…which was enabled by SECULARITY.}

{33  When refuting a thesis, it is not “confirmation bias” to attend explicitly to that which refutes the thesis.  In the event that countervailing evidence constitute a prevailing trend, it doesn’t matter how frequently anecdotal evidence in favor of the thesis is proffered.  If we wanted to disprove the claim that Bob has been sticking to a healthy diet for ten years now, we would focus solely on all the occasions in which he’d eaten food that was unhealthy (going back one decade).  If every day for the past ten years Bob spent roughly half the time eating Twinkies, and the balance of the time eating quinoa, we would need only document his daily intake of Twinkies over that period in order to refute the thesis.  To the objection, “But you are ignoring all the occasions that Bob ate quinoa,” we would simply respond: “In order to refute the thesis, we need only show the incidence–nay, regularity–of Twinkie-consumption.”  To demonstrate Bob’s routine of poor nutrition, his intake of nutritious fare is beside the point.  This goes for ANY context.  “But what about all the days he was nice to everyone?” does not attest to the good character of a serial killer who has committed homicide on, well, many OTHER days.  It is not cherry-picking to enumerate ONLY countervailing evidence (whether it regards Twinkies or murder victims) in order to reveal a trend that contradicts the proposed thesis.  If facts not commensurate with the thesis-in-question are sufficiently prevalent, the thesis is refuted.  After all, junk-food addicts sometimes eat apples.}

{34  The Ottoman Empire–like the Mughal Empire in the Far East–was not a totalitarian theocracy.  It was even willing to accommodate vassal monarchs of other Faiths within its vast domain–as with Druze prince Fakhr ad-Din II of Bakleen (of the Banu Ma’an) in (See footnote 35 below.)  Lebanon (late 16th / early 17th century)…until, that is, he got too big for his britches.  The Lebanese rulers from the Banu Shihab were also Druze.  Not surprisingly, these two tribes quibbled with one another.}

{35  It might be noted that the Ottoman sultanate was not entirely beneficent.  In the waning days of the Empire, the (Muslim) Turks orchestrated a genocide of 1.5 million (Christian) Armenians (between 1915 and 1917)–a massive ethnic cleansing campaign that was the First World War’s Holocaust.  Going back to the 16th century, Ottoman Sultan Suleyman “the Magnificent” instituted a moderated version of pluralism; thereby according unprecedented status to fellow “People of the Book” (i.e. Jews and Christians).  This was done under a newfangled imperial order known as “Kanun‐i Osmani”.  Suleyman’s new policy for “dhimmi” (dubbed “Kanun-i Raya”) was clearly a departure from precedent.  (Reference my essay on the history of legal codes.  I will explore the history of LIBERALISM in the Muslim world in a forthcoming essay: “Islam’s Pyrite Age”.)  Meanwhile, conflict in the Levant can be traced to the dunderheaded “British Mandate” initiated by the knuckle-headed Balfour Declaration–an arrangement hastily cobbled together at the conclusion of the First World War (i.e. pursuant to the dissolution of Ottoman sovereignty).  This set the stage for the disaster in Palestine that would follow the Second World War, whereby Revisionist Zionism was given a free pass to establish a theocratic ethno-State.}

{36  The Koran is hardly a clarion call for women’s rights.  The most notorious passages are verses 3-4, 15, 22-25, 33-34, and 43 of Surah 4.  (Also risible are verses 223-237 and 282 of Surah 2; as well as verses 4-6, 8, and 13 of Surah 24–all of which make clear that women are inferior to men.)  This view is in keeping with the teachings of MoM, wherein we are notified that women are intellectually inferior to men (Bukhari chapt. 12, no. 2658; alt. 1/6/301, 2/24/541, and 3/48/826).  We are also notified that hell is populated primarily by women…because they deserve it (Bukhari 1/2/29; alt. no. 304).  No kidding.  This made sense, as women were said to be less intelligent and less morally capable than men (Muslim no. 241).  And according to Mohammed’s famed companion, Abu Bakra: When MoM heard that Sassanids had made the daughter of Emperor Khosrow their ruler, he scoffed: “Never will a nation succeed that makes a woman its ruler.”  Ironically, there were two successive–and successful–female rulers in Persia (that is: the empire directly to the east of Arabia) during Mohammed’s lifetime.}

{37 For a case-study in this, note the Islamic studies department at Georgetown, which is bought and paid for by the House of Saud.  As eminence grise of Islamic apologia, John Esposito’s paymasters hail from this execrable cabal of tyrants.  Suffice to say, once academics make their money from Wahhabi monarchs, all bets are off.  One may as well deign to learn about the history of Christianity from the faculty at Liberty University.}

Postscript:

The message I aimed to convey in this essay is that Progressively-inclined Muslims cannot formulate a liberalized version of their “din” until they come to terms with the checkered past of Dar al-Islam.  This entails disabusing themselves of ingratiating myths–to which many (otherwise sensible) people obstinately cling…as if the past offered some kind of consolation (a consolation to which they feel they are entitled if they are to bring Islam into the future).

The fact of the matter is: Legitimate or not, Salafism has been there all along.  Yet to hear it from some Islamic apologists, Daesh’s recent (failed) campaign to create a caliphate in the Middle East is something new to the Muslim world–unprecedented in the annals of Islam. {A}  This spurious claim rests on the supposition that the mission of THAT PARTICULAR (unabashedly Salafi) movement were somehow a matter of “hijacking the Faith”–contorting what originally existed into some grotesque new (mutant) version.  This is sheer nonsense.

In reality, “Da’i-i-sh” [alt. “Daesh”; acronym for “Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wal-Sham”] (a.k.a. the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham; rendered “ISIS”) was a return to the way things were in Islam’s first generations–specifically with respect to the “Salaf”.  After all, the entire point of fundamentalism is to revert back to the way things originally were; erasing all subsequent developments, which are seen only as corruptions.  The contention that the ideology animating Daesh is a peculiar novelty of the modern world is untenable.

There are, of course, geo-political and other social-psychological explanations for religious fanaticism; but such factors account more for MOTIVES (incentives given the current exigencies; thus the proximal causes for grievances) more than ideological grounding (which prescribes the means–and rational–for addressing those grievances).  Here, I am concerned with the latter (“beta”); leaving the former (“alpha”) for another day. (See footnote 28 above.)

So why the obstinacy to which so many cling to myths about Salafism as a DEPARTURE FROM Mohammeden precedent rather than as the epitome of it?  We homo sapiens crave certainty.  Moreover, we gravitate toward anything that confirms our biases (especially if it seems to serve our interests).  Today’s Progressive Muslims naturally want to belief that their Faith has always been what they themselves want it to be NOW.

When engaging in critical inquiry, a modicum of self-discipline is required.  As a general rule: If you desperately want to believe what you’re hearing, it makes all the more sense to put your guard up.  This means having the self-discipline to step back and engage in serious critical reflection especially when NOT doing so would be the most convenient.

To reiterate: Focusing on salient incidents is NOT the result of my having succumbed to the trappings of confirmation bias.  It is simply the way that one CONFIRMS / FALSIFIES a proposition.  In order to disconfirm the claim that Salafism is somehow a DEPARTURE FROM Islam as it was originally conceived (and is thus not as it has traditionally existed), I focused on the slew of countervailing evidence that can be easily found in the historical record.

In the preceding essay, such selectivity was not for obfuscation; it was for elucidation.

The relevance of all this is plain to see: The Salafi legacy has repercussions with which we are dealing to the present day.  Indeed, the tirades of today’s fundamentalist preachers are perfectly in keeping with the Sunnah (as originally conceived).  More to the point: modern-day Salafists are doctrinally identical to the Salafists of the Middle Ages…AND, for that matter, to the Salaf THEMSELVES.  An honest reading of the Koran yields the creed touted by Daesh…and the House of Saud…and the Taliban.

So the next time someone claims that Islam has always been a quasi-Progressive religion, request that they look up:

• The imam from Medina, Malik ibn Anas (b. 711)
• Then the Abbasid caliph, Al-Qadir (b. 947)
• Then the Persian theologian, Al-Ghazali (b. 1058)
• Then the imam from Baghdad, Ibn al-Jawzi (b. 1116)
• Then the Palestinian theologian, Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi (b. 1147)
• Then the Kurdish sheikh, Ibn al-Salah (b. 1181)
• Then the Persian sheikh, Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (b. 1263)
• Then the Mamluk faqih from Damascus, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (b. 1292)

…and any number of other Salafi icons.  In doing so, they may discover a common theme–a theme that belies their ingratiating misapprehension.  After all, such men were not outliers; they were some of the most influential figures in medieval Islam.

These same misguided interlocutors may also wish to learn about the odious legacy of the Arabian proselyte, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (b. 1703); and then the Syrian proselyte, Mohamed Rashid Rida (b. 1865).

Far from aberrations of Islamic “aqidah”, each of these men were emblematic.  Not emblematic of EVERY Muslim, of course; but of a distinct strain of “ibadah” [piety] that began with the original incarnation of Mohammedism.

It comes as no surprise, then, that this odious legacy continued into the modern age with:

• Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi (b. 1903)
• Hassan al-Banna (b. 1906)
• Sayyid Qutb (b. 1906)
• Yusuf Abdullah al-Qaradawi (b. 1926)

So what of modern-day Salafists?  Behold six key figures who were born during the two decades between 1941 and 1960:

• Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (b. 1941)
• Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf (b. 1946)
• Ayman Mohammed Rabie al-Zawahiri (b. 1951)
• Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (b. 1954)
• Abu Mohammed [Essam] al-Maqdisi [not to be confused with the medieval Al-Maqdisi] (b. 1959)
• “mullah” Mohammed Omar (b. 1960)

Also note Al-Maqdisi’s protege: Ahmed Fadil al-Nazal al-Khalayleh of Zarqa (a.k.a. “Abu Musab al-Zarqawi”).  These men may have subscribed to a deranged “aqidah” (creed); but their thinking was perfectly in keeping with the thinking of the bellwethers enumerated above. {B}  To not understand this fact is to not understand the history of Islam.  And such ignorance precludes the ability to propound a truly Reformist version of the Faith.

One might ask: Other than a prohibition on usury and infanticide, what has the Sunnah bequeathed to posterity?  The answer: Not much.  The proposition, “If only we REVIVE the Islam of the Salaf, then things will dramatically improve for everyone” has been debunked so many times, one would have to be insane to take it seriously.

In order for genuine Reform to be possible, it is necessary for Muslims to say: “Stop trying to revive the creed as it was in the Dark Ages.  It’s time to try something new.”

Reformation is possible; but not as long as the Ummah remains delusive.  Over the course of Islam’s history, the rare occurrence of a luminary here and there reminds us that things can change for the better; but only insofar as secular principles are espoused.  Such luminaries attest to the fact that the denizens of Dar al-Islam are capable of so much more.  But, ultimately, the solutions cannot be found within ancient scripture.

If we have learned nothing else from the odious figures adumbrated in this essay, it is crystal clear that the problems stemming from the contents of sacred texts cannot be solved by recourse to those same texts.  In order to effect genuine Reform, Muslims must strive for ideals that have merit independently of the religion’s dogmatic foundations.

As simple as it sounds, in order to effect reform, Muslims need only tell the truth–not only to others, but to themselves.

{A  Note here that I do not say “Islamic history”; as the term is nonsensical.  There is no more Islamic history than there is Islamic botany.  By the same token, there is no Judaic history (though there is a history of Judaism) nor Christian history (though there is a history of Christianity); there is only ACTUAL history.  Tragically, there are myriad DISTORTIONS OF history…by this or that ideological camp.  The qualifier here is important.  If a purported obstetrician claimed to be practicing “Islamic embryology”, it would be a queue to disregard anything he said ever again about pregnancy or gynecology.  Likewise with claims of “Wiccan bio-chemistry” or “Buddhist climate science” or “Mennonite astrophysics”.  (As an exercise, try signing up for a class in Hassidic astronomy at the nearest university.)  So it is with “Islamic history”.  A history of X must adhere to the same principles regardless of what X might be–whether X is Islam or baseball.}

{B  What might explain this incidence of prominent Salafi figures within the same (quasi-Baby Boomer) generation?  A possible explanation: They all grew up in the advent of the “Nakba”–a travesty that surely would have spurred not only anti-Semitism (based on a seething resentment of the perceived culprits), but an abiding animus toward “the West” in general.  This vexing geo-political development (alpha factor: social exigencies) would have prompted an urge to lash out…in a way that could be justified by a compelling narrative (beta factor: reaction informed by religiosity).  Hence the propagation of extremism amongst an aggrieved Dar al-Islam.  (Nothing fuels cult activity like frustration / humiliation.)  Religious fundamentalism holds especial appeal to those who feel lost at sea; who need to be validated / vindicated; and who seek a way for their (self-righteous) indignation to be given voice.  See footnote 28 above.}