The History Of Salafism II

SALAFISM IN THE WORLD TODAY:

As history has shown time and time again, the elimination of secular learning is a signature trait of religious fanaticism–irrespective of the religion at hand. The eradication of blasphemous holy sites is another hallmark. When the Taliban destroyed the great Buddha statues at Bamiyan in 2001, they were simply finishing the job that Muhammed ibn Qasim Saqafi, Mahmud Ghazni, Bakhtiyar Khilji, Tamerlane, Aurangzeb, et. al. had started. Indeed, “mullah” Mohammed Omar did what his Salafi predecessors could not do, as they were not equipped with modern explosives. (Thankfully, instructions for making dynamite couldn’t be found anywhere in the voluminous Hadith collections.)

That demolition in the Hindu Kush was one of the most significant archeological travesties of the modern era, as the caves at Bamiyan were one of the greatest wonders of the ancient world; and a cherished part of Buddhist history.  (Alas. Fourteen years later, Daesh would surpass the Taliban’s watermark of destruction–razing countless ancient structures across Syria and northern Mesopotamia.)

To pretend that the Taliban’s heinous actions at Bamiyan–or anywhere else–were somehow unprecedented is to ignore the long, violent history of Salafi hegemony in the region–replete with RAMPANT temple-razing. Alas, the destruction of those grand Buddha statues was par for the course; as was Daesh’s demolition of the ancient Nabataean temples at Palmyra and the Assyrian temples in Nineveh in 2015. {14}

After considering the theological history of Salafism outlined in part 1 of this essay, it is not difficult to connect the dots. The symbiosis between the prevailing theology (outlined in the first part) and the litany of crimes against humanity (outlined in this second part) is as clear as day. From the 7th century to the present, the common thread is impossible to miss…if, that is, one cares to look. The key is to not just look at the actions; it is necessary to look at the accompanying theology as well.

In the 18th century, just as the (Western) Enlightenment was gathering steam, a new movement emerged in Arabia. When Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab of the Najd articulated his vision for Islam, he was not concocting it out of the blue; he was standing on the shoulders of giants–which is simply to say: he was not a pioneer; he was a staunch ideological re-constructionist. It was one of the most tragic developments in modern history when the House of Saud entered into its Faustian pact with Abd al-Wahhab in order to leverage that preacher’s clout for its own political purposes.

In light of the preceding survey, it should be clear that Wahhabism was the opposite of Reformism; it was revanchist through and through. Indeed, Abd al-Wahhab was perfectly frank about what he was trying to do in Arabia. This was made especially clear when the House of Saud made its cynical bargain with him (and, by implication, his insidious cabal of religious fanatics). The powerful cleric’s singular mission was to bring Islam BACK TO THE WAY IT USED TO BE. He was not a trailblazer, he was a retrograde ideologue. At no point was he inclined to say that he was attempting to do something NEW. Why not? Because it had all been done before; and he merely sought to do it again.

To reiterate the point made in part 1 of this essay, genuine reform is progressive in nature. It is oxymoronic to suppose that Reformist versions of an institution can be regressive. Reform is–by definition–about moving forward, not backward. There is a term for bringing things back to the way they used to be: REVERSION. When Salafis / Wahhabis urge Dar al-Islam to bring things back into alignment with the original Mohammedan vision, they are deigning to re-construct what once was. They are proposing a ROLL-BACK.

This is the opposite of Reform.

By contending that Reform can somehow be a matter of regression rather than of progression, one deprives the term of all meaning. Going back to “square one” is hardly the basis of a Reformation. (Note that similar confusion might arise from the dual meaning of “revolution”–which can mean either “coming full circle” or “moving into new territory”. Exploring uncharted waters is not the same as bringing things back around to the point of departure. Alas, the same word is used for a planet’s orbital path around a star as is used for the “American Revolution”.)

The Wahhabi enterprise was a matter of revanchism, not of innovation.

As Robert Dreyfuss explained in “Devil’s Game”: “Spreading the Islamic version of fire and brimstone, Abd al-Wahhab thundered that the Muslims needed to purge themselves of everything that had been learned since the days of [MoM] a thousand years before. It was a revivalist movement in the classic sense.” Dreyfuss added: “To reinforce their message, Abdul Wahhab, Ibn Saud, and their followers had the unfortunate habit of slaughtering anyone who disagreed with them–demolishing their cities, their mosques, and their shrines… The slaughter never ended. In the 1700’s, the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance began a campaign of killing and plunder all across Arabia, first in central Arabia [the Najd], then in Asir in southern Arabia and parts of Yemen, and finally in Riyadh and the Hijaz. In 1802 they raided the Shiite holy city of Karbala in what is now Iraq, killing most of the city’s population, destroying the dome over the grave of a founder of Shiism, and looting property…” (p. 36, 37).

During the early 19th century, similar things occurred in West Africa. In 1809, Fula (Nigerian) “sheik” Usman dan Fodio founded the Sokoto caliphate, anointing himself sultan. (His son, Mohammed Bello, took over in 1815; and was seen as exceptional for having allowed some females to have an education.) Fodio inspired the Fula warlord, “Modibo” Adama bii Ardo Hassana, who undertook a jihad that spread Salafism throughout the region. (The tyrannical Sokoto regime would be abolished in 1903, when the British took control of the region.)

In 1818, Fula (Malian) religious leader, Seeku Aamadu of Timbuktu founded the theocratic Massina Empire (“Hamdu’llahi”), anointing himself “almami”–the Fula equivalent of “Amir al-Mumineen” [leader of the Faithful]. He ruled for 27 grueling years, instituting strict sharia law in the Salafi tradition. So when Mohammed Yusuf founded “Boko Haram” in the region in 2002, he was doing nothing new. He even noted that his biggest influence was none other than Ibn Taymiyyah. How did that come to pass? He studied at the University of Medina, where he was indoctrinated into the Salafi ideology–specifically via the teachings of Egyptian cleric, Shukri Mustafa–founder of the Takfiri organization “Jamaat al-Muslimeen” [alt. “Takfir wal-Hijra”] c. 1960. Thus: Boko Haram did not arise ex nihilo; it was the culmination of a long legacy of African Salafism going back to Seeku Aamadu of Timbuktu in the early 19th century.

As mentioned, the Ottoman Empire was quasi-pluralistic and–one might even say–intermittently secular during its four centuries of prominence (1516 thru 1916). Pursuant to the dissolution of the Empire, the way was opened for fundamentalist Islam to re-emerge in full force. That resurgence can be attributed, in part, to anti-colonial fervor (push-back against what was seen as Occidental imperialism); and hence the sort of geo-political grievances spur fanatical movements. But not ALL of it can be attributed as such. Religiosity was also clearly at play. {18} {22}

As I pointed out in part 1 of this essay, religion provides the framework within which people make sense of–and subsequently address–their grievances, many of which exist for reasons that are not themselves religious. (I dubbed such geo-political exigencies the “alpha” factor; and such framing as the “beta” factor.) Religion furnishes a cause with a rationalization and an aegis. It is a way of mobilizing–nay, galvanizing–people (to ameliorate insecurities; allay fears; engender false hope). It is a way of justifying–nay, mandating–a certain agenda: the magical cure to perceived ills. Alpha is the SOURCE OF grievances; Beta is furnishes a means by which those grievances can be addressed. Neither the circumstances (alpha) or the ideology brought to bear (beta) alone is sufficient to explain WHY religion operates as it does.

Recall that the primary grievance of Sayyid Qutb’s “Stars of Guidance” [“Ma’alim fi al-Tariq”; typically translated as “Milestones”] was not Western imperialism / colonialism; it was a lack of sharia in governance; and a lack of (hyper-puritanical) Islamic “din” in daily life. In other words, while oriented TOWARD the political and social, the BASIS FOR his grievance was explicitly religious. Moreover, his primary focus–one might even say, his TARGET–was the MUSLIM world (spec. the Arab world), not California and Colorado.

What, then, is the mindset with which we are dealing when assaying the atrocities adumbrated in this essay? Certain incidents are telling. In the early 19th century, when the Egyptian chronicler, Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti investigated the advances that had been made by the Europeans, he was left dumbstruck by Enlightenment values. After the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, he was beguiled by a culture in which people prized Reason, sans religious dogmas. And he was dumfounded by the fact that a secularist society had become markedly superior to Dar al-Islam. Such a vexing realization surely undermined his impression that Islam was the key to prosperity.

At the beginning of the 19th century, when Thomas Jefferson asked the Moroccan ambassador why he was supporting the Barbary pirates in their attacks on European merchant vessels, the ambassador candidly replied that the enterprise was legitimized by the laws of the prophet of Islam. That is: It was perfectly in keeping with the Sunnah; so OF COURSE he was obliged to endorse the practice. Jefferson’s Muslim interlocutor stated that it was written in their holy book that all nations that had not answered the call were sinners; and that it was the duty of all Muslims to make war upon non-Muslims wherever they could be found–to seize their booty, and to enslave all that could be taken as prisoners.

In other words, it was the creed AS ORIGINALLY FORMULATED that was used to justify piracy; as piracy was perfectly in keeping with the example of MoM. Since Islam’s first days, followers were marauders as much as they were missionaries. The Moroccan ambassador simply answered Jefferson’s query in precisely the manner the Salaf would have.

During the 1920’s, Nazism was not the only militant, fascistic movement on the rise. In the Middle East, the bloodthirsty “Ikhwan” [“Brethren”; not to be confused with what came to be called the “Muslim Brotherhood” out of Egypt] wreaked havoc across the countryside, persecuting anyone suspected of engaging in “innovation”.  (Note: “bid’ah” means divergence from orthodoxy.)  In their “takfiri” fervor, they slaughtered as many “kuffar” as they possibly could. This included non-fundamentalist Muslims, who were deemed to be “takfirs” for their inadequate doctrinal zeal. {27} The “Ikhwan” echoed MoM’s fondness for decapitations and civilian massacres, hewing to a precedent for pogroms going back to their Salafi forebears.  (Recall that the Koran exhorts jihadis to “strike [non-Muslims] at their necks!”) Unsurprisingly, this particular Salafi band of “ghazi” / “mujahid” was initially abetted by none other than the Arabian monarch: Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal of the House of Saud (a.k.a. “Ibn Saud”). {23}

Such figures engaged in “dawa” (evangelism) in order to perpetuate an insidious illusion. More to the point: They abandoned their humanity in order to maintain (what they saw as) piety. As it happened, this was generally more due to religious explanations (beta) than geo-political explanations (alpha). That’s why it is important to understand things in terms of these two distinct factors. {18}

The virulently anti-Semitic Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad al-Husayn threw in his lot with the Nazis in the 1930’s. His execrable political position was based entirely on religiosity (and personal opportunism). Meanwhile, in Germany, gushing encomia were written in praise of the House of Saud as “the Third Reich Wahhabi style” (ref. H. Lindemann’s “Der Islam im Aufruch, in Abwehr und Angriff”; 1941). Such overt affinity demonstrated the symbiosis between fascisms. Behold the shared (deranged) mentality of mutually-exclusive ethno-centricities.

During the post-War era, the Salafi legacy continued apace. Saudi King Faisal (not to be confused with the Hashemite King of Iraq) undertook avid Wahhabi policies, which paved the way for the emergence of virulent trans-national organizations in the 60’s–notably the Islamic Center of Geneva, the Muslim World League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (all promulgators of the degenerate Wahhabi creed).

Throughout the 1950’s and 60’s, the Grand Mufti of Arabia, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim “Al ash-Sheikh” (the designation for progeny of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) ensured that Saudi policy strictly adhered to the most draconian elements of Wahhabi doctrine. So it would go with his successors: Abd al-Aziz ibn Baaz (a.k.a. “Bin Baz”) and Abd al-Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Abdul Rahman (a.k.a. “Abdul Aziz”).

And when Abboud al-Zumar of Giza issued the fatwa against (Egyptian) Nobel laureate Anwar Sadat in 1981, he was following the example of MoM, as well as many of the most prominent Islamic icons since the religion’s inception. Sadat was assassinated for being a reformer. Revealingly, after Khalid al-Islambuli pulled the trigger, he announced that he had just killed PHARAOH–indicating he was thinking of his act in primarily Koranic terms. Hence an illustrative case of alpha vis a vis beta.

As I discuss elsewhere, the most religious elements of the Palestinian resistance (e.g. Hamas) sullies an otherwise estimable movement. It does so by casting the Palestinians’ tragic plight in explicitly religious terms–ironically, reflecting the derangement of the Revisionist Zionists that they see as their adversaries. Making their resistance a matter of Muslims pitted against Zionists undermines what is (in purely secular terms) a noble cause: the fight for the liberation–and self-determination–of the Palestinian people.  Tellingly, “Hamas” is an acronym for an ISLAMIC resistance movement, not PALESTINIAN resistance movement.  As historian Eugene Rogan put it, “The novelty of Hamas was to articulate Palestinian aspirations in strictly Islamist terms. From its first communique, Hamas set out an intransigent message that combined confrontation with the Jewish state and a rejection of secular Arab nationalism.”  To say that this was shooting a worthy cause in the foot would be an understatement.

The grievances were perfectly legitimate given the geo-political circumstances (alpha); it was the IDEOLOGY (beta) that was the problem.

Likewise, Hizb-ullah means “Party of God” (its progenitor was not coincidentally named the “Islamic Resistance”). That opprobrious organization was formed in reaction to the Israeli government’s massacres in Lebanon in 1982–a problem that could have been addressed in strictly secular terms (i.e. as a human rights violation). Alas, Hizb-ullah’s ultimate goal was to create an Islamic State in Lebanon, thereby mirroring the very crime (theocracy) underlying their ideological adversaries (the Judeo-fascists who were dictating Israeli policy). The party’s 1985 charter stated: “We stress that we are convinced of Islam as a Faith, system of thought and of jurisprudence; and we urge all to recognize it and to resort to its law.” Such hidebound religiosity helps nobody.

Insofar as oppressed Lebanese and Palestinian Arabs make their plight about religiosity instead of about justice, they undermine their own aspirations.

The short-lived “Jabhat al-Islamiyyah lil-Inqadh” [“Islamic Salvation Front”] in Algeria c. 1989 is yet another illustration of this counterproductive approach to resistance. By contrast, next door in Tunisia, genuine Reformation was enabled in 2011 largely because it was undertaken in SECULAR terms (pace the abiding popularity of the “Hizb En-Nahda”).

Tragically, instances of Islamic fundamentalism in the modern world are not outliers. The Salafi icons enumerated in this essay (both parts 1 and 2) were not errant crackpots operating in obscurity on the fringe–bereft of scriptural support and with no claim to ancient legacies. Quite the contrary. There has been a clear precedent for resurrecting Islam in its un-reconstructed (i.e. original) form.

Al-Qaeda’s spiritual leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, followed precisely that precedent in his crusade against Dar al-Kufr. He was not departing from the norms of Dar al-Islam; he was partaking in a tradition that went back almost 14 centuries.

The supposition that Salafism is some modern perversion of the Faith (not the “real” Islam) is entirely spurious; as it rests on a basic misunderstanding what constitutes religious fundamentalism. Want to understand a movement’s tenets? Then look at the FUNDAMENTALS of the creed that it espouses; and then ascertain the degree to which those fundamentals are in keeping with the professed religion as originally conceived.

Today, when we look at the only nations in the world that are still almost entirely Muslim (Somalia, [North] Sudan, Mali, Mauritania, Western Sahara, and Saudi Arabia), we see the only places on the planet where slavery is still openly practiced. This should come as no surprise, as that too is a tradition that goes back fourteen centuries. {24} It should go without saying that such impoverished countries are not helped in any way by sharia–or by ANY theocratic regime, for that matter.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

The point is worth repeating: Insofar as civility occurred in the Muslim world, it was largely in spite of–not because of–any ambient religiosity that may have existed. The Sunnah was not the source of such pluralism; it was–in every case–an obstacle to overcome. The fact that Muslims and non-Muslims happened to get along with one another (living peaceably side-by-side) at various times in various places should not be attributed to the predominance of “sharia”; it should be attributed to over-riding socio-economic exigencies that TRUMPED doctrinal obsessions. Such felicitous developments had little if anything to do with directives found in Islam’s holy book and throughout the Hadith.

The evidence is overwhelming and conclusive: A society is civil in direct proportion to how secular it has managed to become. A regime based on cult activity–like Nazism, Stalinism, or Maoism–does not qualify as secular. In its adherence to “Juche”, North Korea is as secular as Vatican City. These insidious regimes are a reminder that totalitarian theocracy does not require a traditional religion to exist.

And what of the happy exceptions to the overwhelming trend–luminaries like Rumi, Avicenna, and Averroës? In noting such estimable historic figures, Islamic apologists are pointing to what is POSSIBLE. Meanwhile, in acknowledging all the OTHER figures we’ve adumbrated, they will be disabused of consoling misconceptions about Islam’s marvelously irenic past. For they will see that Islam–as with Judaism and Christianity–has had a virulently Reactionary strain since its very inception. Over the centuries, the (notable) exceptions have only further proven the rule.

Let’s be clear: Moving forward, the focus needs to be on what Islam CAN BE, not what it HAS BEEN. One does not need to obfuscate the past in order to forge a way forward. True progress is not built on illusion.

The lesson here is not that Islam has always been fundamentalist–in all places at all times. The lesson here is simple: The claim that “fundamentalism has never been a significant part of Islam” is patently false. For almost fourteen centuries, it has been the rule, not the exception. When Muslims HAVE made progress, it is rarely–if ever–attributable to more stringently hewing to the Sunnah.

Islam can be many different things; as it HAS BEEN many different things throughout its long, checkered history. On the spectrum of Progressive Islam to fundamentalist Islam, there has existed the full range of religiosity throughout what is an amazingly diverse Ummah. But a Reactionary instantiation of Islam has consistently predominated. It is dishonest to pretend that this has not been the case.

Genuine reform is possible. But for a Reform Islam to be viable, Progressive Muslims must come to terms with their religion’s regrettable history. The question is not whether Islam has historically been more good or more bad; the question is WHAT MADE it more good when it was good and WHAT MADE it more bad when it was bad. In what ways was it good? In what ways was it bad?

Such questions must be answered honestly. Only then can work begin on making the Faith become the best that it can be.

It does not help to assume that–by blithely ignoring the prevalence of fundamentalism in Islam’s past–it is easier to promote Reform today. Only by RECOGNIZING the prominence of fundamentalist Islam over the past fourteen centuries can the prerequisites for fundamentalist Islam–and, by counterpoise, the conditions under which Progressive Islam continues to fester–be fully understood. It does nobody any good in the present to ignore the incidences of Salafism in the past, least of all Muslims who are striving to rise above it.

The checkered history of Islam outlined here should not occasion in us the urge to gainsay the religion wholesale. Rather, it should spur us to ask: How is it that this widely-variegated Faith can so easily be made into such a heinous thing? On the other hand: What is it about Progressive Muslims that enables them to be PROGRESSIVE? The two questions are related. We can’t answer one without answering the other.

To effect structural reform in Dar al-Islam, a major paradigm shift is required. This would involve a re-conceptualization of key tenets. All Progressive Muslims advocate for this benign interpretation of “jihad”; yet this is not accomplished by pretending that this is what it has traditionally meant…and what it STILL MEANS in the major “madahib” [schools] of Islamic thought. Rather, it requires one to recognize that this is NOT what it has traditionally meant…and that, consequently, a change is required. The REVISED notion of “jihad” is that it pertains exclusively to one’s own “iman” [Faith], not to “harb” [war]. This entails that all the world must be Dar al-Hudna; and that “dawa” (the promulgation of the Sunnah) only involves promotion of good will toward one’s fellow man. Here, “iman” is ENTIRELY a personal affair.

Until all of “nas” [mankind] dwells within Dar al-Hudna (which is not necessarily concomitant with Dar al-Islam), this mission will remain unfulfilled.

Islam is no more destined to be fundamentalist than any other religion. Muslims needn’t be Reactionary to be devout any more than do the votaries of any other Faith tradition are obliged to do so. There is no reason why Islam needs to remain mired in the odious legacy of Umar, Muhammed ibn Qasim Saqafi, Mahmud Ghazni, Bakhtiyar Khilji, Tamerlane, Aurangzeb, Ibn al-Wahhab, et. al. Those men were Reactionaries, not Reformers. As unabashed re-constructionists, they sought to REVIVE something from the past rather than forge a new path into the future. {26}

Fundamentalism is nothing new in Dar al-Islam; it is merely the creed abiding in its original, un-reconstructed form. Salafism has been baked into the Islamic cake since the 7th century. It is up to Progressive Muslims to now change the recipe.