The History Of Salafism II

FOOTNOTES:

{1  In 642, Caliph Umar instructed his general, Amr ibn al-As, who asked what should be done with the books of the Library of Alexandria: “As for the books you mention, here is my reply: If their content is in accordance with the revelations of god, then we may do without them. For in that case the revelations will more than suffice. If, on the other hand, they contain matters not in accordance with the revelations, there is no need to preserve them. Proceed, then, and destroy them.” (Also ref. the “Tarikh al-Hukama” of Ali ibn Yusuf al-Qifti.) This was nothing new. Five years earlier, Caliph Umar had ordered the great library at Ctesiphon to be razed (by his general, Sa’ad ibn Abi Waqqas). This infamous quotation may be apocryphal; yet it is recorded in the Syriac Chronicle of Bar Hebraeus. Regardless, the quote made it into Islamic lore; and so likely served as inspiration for later Islamic cynosures–Muhammed ibn Qasim Saqafi, Mahmud Ghazni, Bakhtiyar Khilji, Tamerlane, and Aurangzeb being the most obvious. (See footnote 17 below.)}

{2  We can contrast this with the reaction of Alexander the Great (no slouch when it came to rapacious conquest). Upon coming across the great Library of Ashurbanipal at Nineveh, Alexander was INSPIRED by it, not threatened by it. Said inspiration seems to have led to the later construction of the great Library of Alexandria–initiated by his friend: Egyptian “diadochi”, Ptolemaios Soter. What accounts for this drastically contradistinctive approach? The key difference is that Alexander’s (Macedonian) hegemony did not involve a religious agenda. He was not a religious zealot, so he welcomed the chance to learn. Only fanatical religionists are threatened by books.}

{3  Apparently, they couldn’t count on the purported brilliance of the “Recitations” to speak for itself. The primary directive was crystal clear: People of the world needed to be brought to their knees. Other examples of force: In the Middle East, once-thriving cities like Ctesiphon and Caesarea were gratuitously razed. In Ethiopia, Aksum was razed. In Makouria (Nubia), Dongola was razed. This makes no sense…until religious zealotry is taken into account. Sacrilege warranted annihilation. Secular conquest, on the other hand, would have worked to maintain extant infrastructure is new territory–as demonstrated by the Persian Empires (Achaemenid, Parthian, then Sassanid), the Macedonian Empire, and the Roman Empire.}

{4  And so it went: Even the purportedly rationalism-embracing Mu’tazili couldn’t help but be theocratic. The so-called “Bayt al-Hikma” [“House of Wisdom”] in Baghdad is worth mentioning, as it illustrates the present thesis. The institution first burgeoned under Abbasid caliph Abu Ja’far Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Mansur during the 8th century. (Like caliph Umar before him, Al-Mansur died in Mecca during his participation in the Hajj.) One of its first superstars was the Persian polymath, Mohammad ibn Musa of Khwarezm (a.k.a. “Al-Khwarizmi”) credited with the development of algebra–though he did not invent it wholesale. “Bayt al-Hikma” was primarily a place in which works of Classical Antiquity (mostly Greek and Persian) were transcribed into CA (using paper-making techniques appropriated from the Chinese). Ergo the venue is more accurately described as “Khizanat Kutub al-Hikma” (storage place for books of wisdom), as it was a venue where the manuscripts of OTHERS’ wisdom were stored and curated. It was largely a poaching operation, in which extant knowledge was co-opted as the need arose. Also note the so-called (Sunni) “Nizamiyya” network of pedagogic institutions founded during the 11th century (named after the Seljuk vizier, Nizam al-Mulk). That network was established primarily as a theological enterprise to stave off the growing Isma’ili (Shia) influence in Persia. Its most famous instructor: Salafi icon, Al-Ghazali.}

{5  When I seem to fast-forward from one cynosure to another, I am not (strategically) omitting contrary facts in the intervening period. Rather, I am focusing exclusively on the most salient events / people–none of which arose in isolation. Everything is a touchstone even in what is a common thread. Salafism existed along a continuum, even when it occurs at the nodes of punctuated equilibria. (Dare I say, ESPECIALLY when it occurs at the nodes of punctuated equilibria.) It is through the HIGHLIGHTS that we can start to see the general shape of things, and discern a pattern over the long-term. For elaboration on this point, see footnote 29 below.}

{6  Actually, there was another motivation at play: material gain. Mahmud Ghazni was obsessed with plunder. He regularly orchestrated pillaging sprees into India in order to increase his vast stores of treasure. By some estimates, he eventually became the wealthiest ruler in history. Suffice to say, this was NOT a philanthropic venture. As with MoM before him, Ghazni was obsessed with accumulating loot. As the uber-decadent House of Saud reminds us today, it is possible to be both incredibly greedy and incredibly devout at the same time. Such schemes demonstrate that “zakat” can go both ways. That is: It can be invoked as a reason to give OR as an excuse to take. Ghazni’s hoarding complex was effectively zakat-in-reverse (masquerading as zakat, of course). The rational is simple: If a ruler fashions himself to be working on god’s behalf, then he–and he alone–does not need to give to charity; YOU need to give to HIM…in the service of “the cause”. Following MoM’s example (20% of the booty goes to the leader), Ghazni’s gargantuan stash was accumulated in the name of god. (Unlike MoM, he didn’t just take a cut; he seized almost everything for his own coffers.) So far as he saw it, his pathological materialism was an expression of his piety. (See footnote 19 below.)}

{7  Tamerlane certainly would have caused even more devastation had he lived longer. He fell ill and died on his way to exterminate yet more people in (Ming) China. Tamerlane was a prime example of Muslims fighting Muslims. Indeed, many of those he slaughtered were other Muslims (whom he did consider proper Muslims). His hoards slaughtered countless Ottomans (e.g. at Aleppo) as well as the residents of cosmopolitan centers like (Mamluk) Damascus, (Kartid) Herat, and (Tughlaq) Delhi. He even massacred his fellow Turkic-Mongols in Jalayir-ruled Baghdad (a.k.a. the “Jalair”). The Jalayirid regime was deemed errant (and so not REALLY Muslims, so far as he saw it). In fact, Tamerlane’s sacking of Baghdad shows that his genocides had nothing to do with racism; they were all about RELIGION. For he sought to resurrect the proper sultanate of the city (the Islamic “Il-khanate” of the House of Hulagu) even if it meant eradicating fellow Turkic-Mongols (those of the Jalayirid dynasty). But why the House of Hulagu if Hulagu himself had not been Muslim? Because the first Mongol to convert to Islam was Mahmud Ghazan “the Great” of the Hulagu (i.e. “Il-khanate”) line, in the 13th century. Recall that it was Ghazan who fought the heretical (Tengri) Chagatai Khanate. It is important to bear in mind that, per the doctrine of “taqfir”, Muslim-on-Muslim violence is not seen as such by the perpetrators. The targets have been deemed apostates, and so are not considered fellow believers. (See footnote 27 below.)}

{8  This was demonstrated by both the Persian and Roman Empires–with their (measured) tolerance of alternate Faiths within their respective dominions. As far as the Persian and Roman rulers were concerned, so long as civilians’ religious activity did not undermine their authority (i.e. interfere with the operation of the State; or sully its name), such activity was permissible. Their only concern was political disruption (i.e. sedition). This is because the sine qua non of those regimes was political power, not evangelism. (The same an be said of the pre-Islamic Mongols, whose Tengri-ism was inherently pluralistic.) That is to say: Imperialism, not theocracy, impelled their hegemony (and defined their imperium). Once such regimes WON any given conflict, they had no reason to slaughter civilians. They were only fighting to effect territorial sovereignty (i.e. to secure political dominion), and to suppress political dissidence. This was the case in Christendom up until Emperor Theodosius, who–via the Edict of Thessalonika in 380–made the Roman Empire a theocracy, in which heresy finally DID become a concern (see my essay, “Genesis Of A Church”).  Said tolerance continued to be the case in Persia until the fall of the Sassanids at the hands of the Mohammedans. Such a precedent can be juxtaposed against Islamic imperialism, which was categorically theocratic. Unlike Roman Catholic theocrats, though, Islamic rulers did not force their subjects to convert; only to submit to sharia law. (Islamic LAW, not Islamic FAITH, was spread by the sword. Sharia does not require people to be Muslim; only to submit to Islamic authority.) In this sense, during the Middle Ages, there was more religious freedom in the Muslim world than there was within the oppressive orbit of Roman Catholicism.}

{9  Note that this can be contrasted with cases in which Muslim leaders have perpetrated atrocities for reasons other than religious ones. Indeed, when a leader who happens to be Muslim does horrible things, we cannot necessarily attribute it to fealty to the Sunnah (or adherence to Mohammedan precedent). For example, when Ottoman cynosure, Mehmed Talaat “Pasha” committed the Armenian genocide during the first World War, it was for primarily nationalistic reasons. That is to say, his ethnic cleansing of Armenians was probably due to their non-Turkish-ness more than to their non-Muslim-ness. In the 1970’s, Ugandan president Idi Amin Dada engaged in ethnic cleansing and the elimination of subversives. His purges had little to do with grievances against the targets’ (lack of) Faith. He was not attempting to be pious; he was just a psychopath who was intolerant of even the slightest dissent. (See footnote 11.) Meanwhile, the ruler of [north] Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, is BOTH a racist AND a religious fanatic–ergo his ethnic cleansing of Darfur. Other despots are only incidentally Muslim–as with Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Iraq’s Sadaam Hussein, Syria’s Bashir Assad, Turkmenistan’s Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov, etc. Their despotism cannot be PRIMARILY attributed to an obsession with the Sunnah. Other despots PRETEND that what they’re doing is NOT for religious reasons, even though it clearly is–as with Jordan’s Hussein bin Talal and Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf. In sum: Some people are iniquitous without needing to use religion as an excuse.}

{10  The primary motive for Tamerlane’s deeds was religious zealotry. To corroborate this, let’s take as a point of reference the hegemony of the most ravenous conqueror in history, Genghis Khan. At no point was Genghis inclined to impose Tengri-ism on anyone. Why not? He was avaricious, but his motivations were never religious. Generally speaking: destroying universities and libraries has nothing whatsoever to do with imperialism; it has everything to do with theocracy. So, though he fucked as many women as possible and killed anyone who stood in his way MILITARILY, Genghis Khan was not known for razing schools or burning books. He was a pragmatist, not a religious nut. In fact, he undertook his rapacious conquest while championing religious freedom. (Such was the nature of Tengri-ism.) By stark contrast, Tamerlane fashioned himself a “mujahid” (a.k.a. “jihadist”; holy warrior). For Tamerlane, the discrepancy between being a Khan who adopted Islam as an adult and a caliph / sultan / emir / mullah who had been born into the Faith was beside the point. After all, fundamentalism is fundamentalism. The only reason Tamerlane did not proclaim himself “Khalifah” is that–being Turkic-Mongol–he was not from the appropriate blood-line (Qurayshi Arabian). This did not prevent him from claiming to be doing the work of the Koran’s protagonist…and being adamant about that fact at every turn. He felt he had the imprimatur of the Creator of the Universe–a conviction that effectively gives one license to do anything one wishes. When one is a megalomaniac, the consequences of such zealotry are dire, as the full extent of one’s megalomania can be realized with impunity. In sum: The juxtaposition between these two infamous Khans is very telling. WHY was one in the business of book-burning while the other was not? The answer couldn’t be clearer: Because one was threatened by knowledge while the other was eager to assimilate it. Such a gross discrepancy between conquerers reflects one of the fundamental differences between Tengri-ism and traditional Islam. For more on the influence of the Mongols, see my essay on the long history of legal codes; as well as my essay on Islam’s so-called “Golden Age”: “Islam’s Pyrite Age”.}

{11  Notable “mujahideen” in Afghanistan included Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulb ud-Din Hekmatyar, Burhan ud-Din Rabbani, and–as already discussed–the notorious Sayyid Abul A’la Maududi. There are some cases in which it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which religious zealotry accounts for atrocities when other factors are at play. For example, when Yahya “Khan” and Ghulam Azam orchestrated the genocide of three million Bengalis (with special emphasis on the elimination of intellectuals) in 1971, it may not have been entirely attributable to religiosity (i.e. to his Salafism). Though a religious fanatic, they were driven by (Pakistani) nationalism in conjunction with a virulent (anti-Bengali) racism. (Also note the role of such figures as Inam ul-Haq Khan, Tikka Khan, and Gul Hassan Khan.) Suffice to say: They would not have approved of this had he been a Quaker. In any case, an Islamic fundamentalist slaughtering intellectuals was nothing new.}

{12  Pakistan is an Islamic (Deobandi) theocracy just about as ridiculous as that of either Iran (Usuli) or Saudi Arabia (Wahhabi).  The Taliban are effectively Deobandi theocrats, who’s dominion is located across the Hindu Kush.  (Waziristan straddles the boarder between Afghanistan and Pakistan.)  Both Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s blasphemy laws ensure that those accused of “insulting the prophet” (read: saying anything unpalatable about MoM, no matter how accurate) are punished or killed. Who else punished / killed people for insulting the Seal of the Prophets? The Seal of the Prophets himself.}

{13  Note that Tamerlane (Timur of Kesh), who was of the Barlas tribe, mustn’t be confused with the earlier Khan, Taghlugh Timur, who was leader of the (adversarial) Chagatai tribe. (Taghlugh Timur converted to Islam later in life, and reigned until his death in 1363.) The first Khan to convert to Islam was actually Berke in c. 1240; who would go on to support the (Egyptian) Mamluks of the Kipchak line against the (Persian) Ilkhanate of the (Mongol) Hulagu line. (HIS brother was named Tukh-Timur.)  Tamerlane also mustn’t be confused with Temür Öljeyitü Khan of Yuan / Cheng-zong (grandson and successor to Kublai), who ruled ALMOST a century before Tamerlane…nor with Möngke Temür of the Golden Horde, who ruled OVER a century before Tamerlane…nor with the contemporary of Tamerlane: Jurchen chief, Möngke Temür of the Odoli (rendered “Dudu Meng[e]-timu[r]” in Manchu), who ruled in Jian-zhou.  It bears worth repeating: Those inclined to apologize for Islam’s checkered history tend to elide Tamerlane’s extensive atrocities–which are often misattributed to Genghis Khan (who was Tengri-ist), or the Mongols-in-general. A flagrant case of this elision is Peter Frankopan’s (otherwise estimable) “The Silk Roads”, which devotes only a SINGLE PAGE to Tamerlane in a book of over 500 pages–referring to him simply as a famed warlord. One may has well write a history of medieval France and gloss over Charlemagne.}

{14  It is instructive to note that the Deobandi movement (of which the Taliban is the paragon) was inspired by an 18th-century, Hanafi theologian who served under Aurangzeb: Shah Wali-ullah Dehlawi–an ultra-orthodox “muhadith” from Delhi. In essence, Deobandism emerged from the compilation of the “Fatawa-e Alamgiri”, a process of which Shah Wali-ullah Dehlawi played a prominent role. (See footnote 12 above.) Today, the Haqqani network of madrasahs in the Hindu Kush (named after their patriarch, Jalal ud-Din Haqqani of “Hezb-e Islami” fame) owes its ideology to this execrable legacy. “Hezb-e Islami” was founded in 1975 by Gulb ud-Din Hekmatyar, a Salafi mullah.}

{15  Things were not so rosy, however. Abd al-Rahman III of Cordoba was known for keeping a male harem. It was not just his sexuality that is now verboten in Islamic circles. He orchestrated a massacre of a hundred prominent Christian civilians c. 939; and is said to have done so MERELY FOR SHOW (that is: to send a message to anyone considering infidelity). All were marched to an orchard by one of his residences, then decapitated. This was primarily done as a warning to non-Muslims in his realm; though it certainly included a general caution against subversion. Such persecution of Jews was not an anomaly. Other Salafi leaders would become notorious for pogroms–as with the Algerian “alim”, Muhammad al-Maghili of Tuat, who viewed “dhimmis” as inferior and undertook campaigns against the Jews of the Maghreb in the 15th century.}

{16  It should be noted that there is a chance MoM did not actually say this, as it directly contradicts two verses in the Koran: 2:256 and 109:6 (though either may have been composed more than a century after his ministry). Be that as it may, the passage occurs in the MOST vaunted Hadith; and it is paraphrased in vol. 1 of “Muslim” (no. 33), the SECOND-most vaunted Hadith. So it is safe to assume that–veritable or not–this derisive exhortation was heeded by many a devout Muslim over the centuries. Several other infamous passages in “Bukhari” did not exactly help the matter–notably: 1/35, 11/626, 52/177, and 52/256. (And let’s not forget no. 4294 in vol. 19 of “Muslim”.) The Sunnah is–after all–based upon the Hadith record. And though EVERYTHING in the Hadith must be taken with a hefty grain of salt (in terms of historical accuracy), the fact of the matter remains that what is in the “sahih” Hadith is there to be invoked by any Muslim deigning to rationalize his deeds by recourse to scripture. Such recourse is given sanction by a Reactionary mindset. Within a Reform-minded paradigm, such a maneuver would be recognized as entirely spurious.}

{17  In mentioning these figures, I am not cherry-picking obscure crackpots; these are some of the most celebrated rulers in the history of Dar al-Islam. Not only are they representative of Islam for much of its history, they epitomize its most traditional form TO THIS DAY. Note that Umar was assassinated–of all times–as he was performing the Hajj. (Not exactly a ringing endorsement from the Creator of the Universe.) Indeed, such an ignominious end to such a prominent confessor was an odd way for the Koran’s protagonist to show approval for Mohammedan supplication. God’s plan seems not to have included protecting the leaders of the Muslim world. In any case, Umar’s worldview did not die with him. It persists to the present. We now call it “fundamentalism”, as it is based on the fundamentals that Umar–like the rest of the Salaf–espoused. The only thing that is “extreme” about Salafism is its unreconstructed ideological purity.}

{18  It is necessary to adduce the interplay between Alpha and Beta if one is to procure a full explanation of the deeds of religious zealots in a geo-political context. Thus Daesh may well have had (areligious) geo-political reasons for trying to establish a caliphate in Syria-Iraq; but it did not raze the ancient structures of Palmyra for any reasons that could be explicated in terms of Alpha (e.g. socio-economic grievances, resentments against the West, military strategy, propaganda, etc.) Such destruction can ONLY be explained by recourse to Beta (i.e. fanatical religiosity). Only BETA can explain why Wahhabis lock innocent schoolgirls in burning buildings to burn to death rather then allow them to escape unveiled. It’s why Deobandis throw battery acid into the faces of schoolgirls for trying to get an education. It’s why Shiite fundamentalists stone alleged adulterers to death. It’s why Salafis murder magazine illustrators. Alpha has nil relevance when it comes to such behavior; as such heinous deeds are prompted explicitly by doctrinal mindsets. The Alpha-Beta dichotomy is crucial in making the distinction between predicaments (and the grievances to which they give rise) and the manner in which those predicaments / grievances are addressed. Another illustration of this were the Pashtun military leaders, “Ghazi” Mirzali “Khan” of Waziristan (a.k.a. the “Faqir of Ipi”), “Mullah” Powindah, and Sartor Faqir (a.k.a. “Mullah Mastan”), who resisted the British “Raj” in the 1930’s…a half-century before the “mujahideen” resisted the Russians in the Hindu Kush. This is why questions like “Was it due to colonialism or Islam?” are based on a false dichotomy. It’s like wondering whether to blame a drunk-driving accident on the motion of the colliding cars or on the driver’s intoxication.}

{19  …just as with Saudi oil billionaires who fashion themselves Wahhabis. (Their obscene affluence is a sign of god’s good graces, doncha know!) Indeed, Arabian plutocrats have become somewhat of a cliche in the past few generations. Case in point: Qatari “sheikh”, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani. (One might ask: Where is HIS zakat?) The most recent example of Salafi hypocrisy was uber-corrupt Afghan president, Hamid Karzai–who funneled hundreds of millions of dollars into his own pockets during his baleful rule.}

{20  The celebrated Mughal emperor, Akbar the Great was far from ideal. Even though he was significantly better than most of the world’s Muslim rulers during the Middle Ages, persecution of ethnic minorities during his tenure was not unheard of. While Roman Catholicism was generally theocratic / reactionary throughout the Middle Ages (vestiges of which remain to this day), there was no equivalent in the Muslim world to Russian reformer Catherine II, Habsburg reformer Joseph II, or Prussian reformer Frederick II (all of the 18th century). To the degree that Akbar failed to be more liberal than he was, it was because of his abiding religiosity. To the degree that said European reformers managed to be as liberal as they were, it was because of their secular tendencies. Put another way: Insofar as Akbar was Progressive, it is because he managed to DEPART FROM his fealty to the Sunnah; while said European reformers would have been even more estimable had they embraced secularity more than they did. In lauding Akbar, we mustn’t gloss over his flaws.}

{21  This is, of course, relatively-speaking. In the 17th century, these semi-liberal rulers might be compared to the significantly MORE liberal (Hindu) king, Shivaji Bhonsle of Raigad (a.k.a. “Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj”), founder of the Maratha Empire. Other quasi-tolerant Muslim potentates in the Far East included Kashmiri sultan, Ghiyas-ud-Din Zain-ul-Abedin in the 15th century; as well as “Badshah” Fateh Ali Khan Shahab (a.k.a. “Tipu Sultan”) and Hyder Ali Khan, sultans of Mysore (southern India) during the 18th century. In the West, quasi-tolerant Muslim potentates included the 10th-century Andalusian emirs, Abd ar-Rahman III and his son, Al-Hakam II of Cordoba: both scholars AND patrons of the arts. (See footnote 15 above.) Both of THOSE emirs can be contrasted with the ensuing Islamic fundamentalism of the late 10th thru 12th centuries, starting with the vehemently anti-intellectual tyrant, Al-Hajib al-Mansur (who’s specialty was book-burning), then under the Almoravids and Almohads. Tellingly, Al-Mansur’s first act was the destruction of the libraries that flourished under his predecessors: the aforementioned Abd ar-Rahman III and Al-Hakam II. (In 976, within months of the death of Al-Hakam II, he razed the Great Library of Cordoba, burning all the books of science and philosophy inside.) Such juxtapositions help us understand what separates fundamentalist Islam (libraries bad) from Reformist Islam (libraries good). (See footnote 25 below.) This is a distinction that cannot be fully explained within a conventional framework.}

{22  We should bear in mind that Western imperialism set the stage for much of the Islamic fundamentalism that eventually metastasized across central Asia. In Afghanistan, funding of the mujahideen (conducted primarily to spite the “communist” Russians) paved the way for the Taliban’s takeover. The U.S.-backed overthrow of the democratically-elected Mosaddegh in Iran put into power an autocrat (read: western lackey; obnoxiously dubbed the “Shah”), who’s despotic rule eventually led to the Khomeini-ist revolution in 1979. And the Israeli government all but created Hamas by supporting the only viable alternative (the “Mujama al-Islamiya”; precursor to Hamas) to the secular-socialist P.L.O. For there is nothing Revisionist Zionists despise more than socialism (read: secularism). And nobody has supported the House of Saud (and thereby helped to facilitate the spread of Wahhabism around the world) than the United States…although the United Kingdom has engaged in its fair share of patronage of the execrable Arabian monarchy. This includes not only military and political support for the theocratic regime in Arabia, but allowing Saudi princes to annex academic departments in both the U.S. and England.}

{23  The Saudi “Ikhwan” was founded c. 1913; and armed by the British, who adopted the House of Saud as clients. This mustn’t be confused with the Egyptian “Ikhwan al-Muslimeen” [Muslim Brotherhood] founded in 1928. The former eventually got out-of-hand. The British and Saudis eventually put their foot down, and eradicated them by 1930. Nevertheless, the point holds: This fanatical movement was not an aberration. In assaying execrable movements based on religious fundamentalism, we should bear in mind that NON-religion-based pogroms are also common–as anyone knows who has studied Lenin and Mao. Stalin’s genocide of the Kulaks in Ukraine was based on socio-political antipathy; his genocide of Khazaks, Kyrgyz, and Mongols was based on racism. The genocide conducted by the Ottoman triumvirate (a.k.a. the “three pashas”) against the Armenians in Anatolia–as well as the subsequent persecution / oppression of the Kurds–was based largely on racial animus (read: Turkish supremacy).}

{24  Other Islamic theocracies (like north Sudan, Mali, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Brunei) allow some non-Muslims to reside in certain parts of the country…even if in the midst of legalized slavery and draconian blasphemy laws. If only the Koran had said even just a SKOSH about civil rights or political freedom or social democracy, tremendous amounts of pointless suffering / death would surely have been avoided in such countries…over the course of the past millennium-plus. Humanitarian atrocities and Salafism INVARIABLY go hand in hand. This is no coincidence. Indeed, an abiding adherence to the Sunnah has done worse-than-nothing to help such closed societies.}

{25  It is no coincidence that the first institution of higher learning in the Muslim world, the madrasah of Al-Qarawiyyn at Fes (Morocco), was founded in the 10th century by a Tunisian women (Fatima al-Fihri of Kairouan) on behalf of the Idrisids. The Idrisids were Zaidiyyah (Shiites). Comically, Sunni apologists will brag that the first university (now simply known as “Al-Qarawiyyn”) was founded by Muslims in one breath; then in the next breath deny that Shiites are true Muslims…failing to realize the contradiction. (Note that Zaidi and Mutazili Shiism are similar in many respects.) Today, the most esteemed institution of higher learning in the Muslim world, Al-Azhar University, was first established as a madrasah by the Fatimids…who were Isma’ili (Shiites). In other words, BOTH acclaimed institutions were established by those would have been persecuted and/or killed by EVERY ONE of the fundamentalist rulers enumerated in this essay. The existence of such institutions is not an argument for Islam per se; it is an argument for a CERTAIN KIND of Islam–a Reformed Islam (which–in theory–can be found in either Shia or Sunni versions). It might also be noted that, to this day, Al-Azhar University (ironically, now a Sunni bastion) serves, in large part, as an indoctrination facility–analogous to Bar-Ilan University in Israel (which is little more than a base for promulgating Revisionist Zionist ideology). Any genuine education that DOES occur at Al-Azhar is that which has nothing whatsoever to do with religion. In other words, the institution is a place of learning IN SPITE OF, not because of, Islam.}

{26  These men were not aberrations in an otherwise immaculate theological record. (See footnote 29 below.) Due to the persistence of a prevailing Reactionary mindset, they remain some of the most highly-esteemed theologians-of-yore…throughout the Ummah…to this day. They were not anomalies; they were indicative of a clear pattern. The question becomes: What were the traditions / teachings these figures were striving to uphold? To wit: When it comes to religious fundamentalism PER SE, it boils down to what the FUNDAMENTALS happen to be. (Obsessions only make sense once we’ve identified what’s being obsessed over.) Fundamentalism qua fundamentalism is dysfunctional by its very nature; as it is invariably dogmatic and reactionary. Be that as it may, the CONTENT matters. This is why fundamentalist Jains are the religionists the world is least worried about. (The more fanatical they become, the LESS malign they become.) Replace “ahimsa” with “jihad” (or vice versa), and suddenly fundamentalism–and thus proselytization–has entirely different ramifications. Accordingly, we’re not frightened of die-hard Quakers. The iconic figures enumerated in this essay operated according to certain FUNDAMENTALS–that is: the foundational tenets on which Islamic fundamental-ISM is based. As we’ve seen, those tenets have been operative since the religion’s inception.}

{27  We should bear in mind that, to this day, when Muslims persecute / attack fellow Muslims, they do not think of it as such. As far as they are concerned, they are simply fighting “murtadd” (apostates)–an act deemed to be pious according to Koranic passages like 3:85-91 and 4:89. And so it went: There was no STRATEGIC benefit to razing the Isma’ili villages at Mazandaran and Anjudan. Nevertheless, as a self-styled executor of god’s will, Tamerlane attacked them because of their BELIEFS; eradicating every last woman and child. It wasn’t bad enough that he was hell-bent on violent conquest; he was a religious fanatic to boot. (Hegemony and zealotry often go hand in hand.) That was over six centuries ago, in central Asia; so it can’t be blamed on “Western” colonialism / imperialism. Tamerlane was not an isolated case, nor was he doing something new. Note, for example, the innumerable fellow Muslims (notably, Khwarezmis) slaughtered by Ghurid Sultan, Mu’izz ad-Din Muhammad of Ghor in the 12th century. He had no compunctions about killing them. Why not? Because they weren’t the right KIND of Muslims (i.e. HIS kind). Hence, in his eyes, he was simply killing apostates, just as MoM would have wanted.}

{28  Here are FORTY examples, accounting for two dozen countries: Hezb-i Islami (Afghanistan), the Taliban (Pakistan / Afghanistan), Jamat-ul-Ahrar / Lashkar-i Taiba / Tehreek-i Islami (Pakistan), Jamaat-i Islami / Ansar-ullah Bangla / Hefazat-i Islam / Harakat al-Jihad-i Islami [alt. “Islami Dawat-i Kafela”] (Bangladesh), Abu Sayyaf / Ansar al-Khalifa (Philippines), Jamaah Anshurut Daulah (Indonesia), National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali), Boko Haram (Nigeria), Jabhat al-Islamiyyah lil-Inqadh [Islamic Salvation Front; alt. “Front Islamic du Salut”] (Algeria), Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya (Libya), Katiba al-Multhamun [Battalion of Masked Men] (Maghreb), Jemaah Islamiyyah (Egypt / Indonesia), Al-Shabaab (Somalia / Kenya), Sudan People’s Liberation Army / Janjaweed (Sudan), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (Iraq), Ansar al-Islam (Kurdistan), Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Jordan / Iraq), Muntada al-Ansar / Daesh (Syria / Iraq), Jabhat al-Nusra / Jaysh al-Islam / Nour al-Din al-Zenki (Syria), Abu Nidal / Hamas (Palestine), Osbat al-Ansar / Hizb-ullah / Islamic Jihad (Lebanon), the (anti-Khomeinist) Mujahideen-i Khalq / the (pro-Khomeinist) Fedaiyan-i Islam / the [k]Homeinist regime itself [viz. the IRGC] (Iran), Ansar al-Sharia (Arabia / Tunisia / Libya), and the Highest Military Majlis-ul Shura of the United Forces of the Mujahideen of the Caucasus / Riyad-us Saliheen / Shariat Jamaat (Chechnya). We might also note pan-national Salafi organizations like “Hizb ut-Tahrir” [Party of Liberty] and the “Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami” [Islamic World League]–both of which have affiliates in many other countries besides.}

{29  The thing with using countervailing evidence to refute a proposition is that one needs to provide ONLY countervailing evidence to do so. This all seems elementary; yet religious apologists (of ALL stripes) often fail to grasp the most basic principles of falsification; and level accusations of “cherry-picking” when selectivity is THE WHOLE POINT. If one aims to refute the proposition, “Bob has rarely–if ever–been to Nebraska”, the task is relatively straight-forward. Rather than focus on all the times that Bob has spent in California, one can simply enumerate the occasions he visited Omaha. If it turns out that Bob ROUTINELY went to–and remained at length in–Omaha throughout his life (and did so for reasons he made loud and clear), then the long days he spent at his Malibu beach house are not relevant. Thus “Over the course of his life, Bob has made it a point to stay away from Nebraska” is a false statement, irrespective of the prodigious time he spent on the Gold Coast. Moreover, “He went on vacation to Paris numerous times” is completely irrelevant. It is no secret that “usually” and “rarely” are relativistic terms; but there are clear cases where they do not apply. Hence the plea, “Nebraska?! But what about all those summers that Bob spent in France!” just doesn’t cut it; especially after we discover Bob was born and raised in Omaha, and returns there on a regular basis. The fact that he often spends time in places outside of Nebraska–and now resides in California, proclaiming Paris his favorite destination–is entirely beside the point. (See footnote 30 below.)}

{30 After all: Abusive husbands might hug their wives as much as they beat them (incidents of the former do not absolve them of responsibility for the latter; nor does it nullify the characterization of “abusive”). A final point: We can advise Bob to never return to Nebraska, of course; but this doesn’t require us to pretend that he’s never been there. In fact, DISREGARDING all the reasons he tends to go back to Nebraska might make it more difficult to persuade him to stay away in the future.}

{31  This is not to say that a desire to do something cannot precede the belief that one finds oneself embracing (in order to legitimize that desire). Indeed, one’s decision to act sometimes occurs before the belief associated with the action. In such cases, the will to do X is prior to procuring the framework by which one rationalizes X. Indeed, it is possible to have settled upon doing X, then adopt (and deploy) a belief that justifies X post hoc. When this happens, one often misattributes one’s will–such as it is–to an ANTECEDENT belief. Even in such cases, the belief is operative (and is often a clinching factor; a nudge) vis a vis the latent proclivity for X. For either way, one ends up justifying one’s actions by recourse to the belief. Thus one avers: “I believe this, and that’s WHY I did X” even when the will to do X preceded one’s adoption of the belief. (In other words: One was looking to do X ALL ALONG, and professing the belief NOW simply enables one to feel justified in doing it.) Such a scenario does not nullify the relevance of the belief; as a pattern of behavior cannot subsist without a compelling narrative vehicle. This post hoc justification is more self-serving than it is the result of serious deliberation (that is: a conclusion reached after having engaged in a meticulous process of sound reasoning). As delusive as it is, this “post hoc ergo proctor hoc” approach to belief has tremendous allure; and often occurs unwittingly. For when seeking a mode of validation, it is tempting to seize onto a tenet that happens to suit one’s purposes, and thereafter suppose that one had subscribed to the tenet from the get-go. (As it turns out, many beliefs are beliefs-of-convenience.) Subsequently, one is inclined to pretend the action originally proceeded from the belief…when, in reality, it’s the action one wanted to take IN THE FIRST PLACE (for reasons that were independent of the adopted belief). This is where the distinction between Alpha and Beta is especially salient (ref. footnote 18 above). To further complicated matters, there is a difference between merely PROFESSING a belief (as a sheerly pragmatic measure) and genuinely having the belief. Put another way: There is difference between a first-order belief (actually believing such-and-such) and a second-order belief (BELIEVING IN believing such-and-such). Typically, the believer does not discern the difference, and–for all intents and purposes–treats the latter as though it were the former. Proceeding AS IF one believed something often suffices for the purposes of rationalizing / validating a desired action. Few are diligent in scrutinizing their own epistemic integrity, so retain the IMPRESSION OF a conviction without having to actually go to the trouble of sincerely harboring that conviction. (That’s why there are no theists in foxholes; at least none that are likely to do what’s necessary to survive.) It’s ardent BELIEF IN the belief in god that usually passes for devoutness in religious circles. At the end of the day, piety is more performative than cognitive. After all, we homo sapiens are eminently pragmatic creatures. Shorn of the dogmatic scaffolding that gives dubious actions a veneer of credence, people might feel obliged to critically scrutinize what they have conventionally seen as righteous deeds.}

{32  This is taken from “Classical Islam” by G.E. von Grunebaum, p. 70.  Zayid was appointed by the first Umayyad caliph, Muawiyah.  He clearly thought of his governance as a function of “ibadah” (piety); so would have couched his policies in terms of “rashid” (being guided by god).}