The History Of Salafism II

APPENDIX 3:

Some of the more unscrupulous Islamic apologists are inclined to embark on cherry-picking expeditions to cull a few isolated Koranic passages that seem to enjoin comity—as if those excerpts somehow trumped the 41 passages enumerated earlier; and thus countermanded the overall (prevailing) theme of Islam’s holy book.  Let’s look the most notable of these gems.

ONE:  4:90, 8:61, and 60:8 tell us: “If [your adversaries] leave you alone, and do not wage war against you, and offer you peace, then god does not oblige you to fight them.”  These two passages are not as magnanimous as they might seem at first blush.  Their message: You are not OBLIGATED to fight non-Muslims; thus leaving open the permissibility of fighting.  In other words, the prerogative to fight—even when one has not been attacked—remains fully in tact. 

The most charitable way to interpret this admonishment is to assume that the phrase “does not obligate you to fight” means “does not give you cause to fight”.  This involves construing “you are not required to X” as “X is not warranted”.  While such a salutary reading should be encouraged, it is likely not what was originally intended.  After all, there is a difference between a lack of obligation and a prohibition.

These passages allow for Muslims to desist from warfare if they are not being actively attacked.  Hence, armistice is permissible, but not required.  This is hardly a mandate for universal peace.  25:63 states of “those who walk the land in humility” that when they encounter anyone who is ignorant, they simply say “salaman” [the equivalent of the Hebrew “shalom”].  Are we to conclude from such isolated passages that the overarching theme of the Koran is pacifism?

Let’s explore further.  41:34 intimates a somewhat conciliatory posture when it comes to “dawa”, urging patience regarding someone with whom you do not get along (thereby eventually turning enmity into amity).  We thus are adjured to return an iniquitous deed with kindness.  42:40-43 and 60:7-9 have a similar message.  They state that “the requital of an evil deed is an evil one like it; but whoever forgives, and seeks conciliation / amends, his reward is with god.”  They go on: “One has cause to act only against those who oppress people and cause mischief in the land, violating the ordained laws.”  (We find a comparable statement in 5:45: “Whoever forgoes [an eye for an eye] as an act of charity, it will be an atonement for him.”)

It is worth looking into the meaning of these locutions. Here, “causing mischief in the land” is generally equated with causing “fitna”—that is: disrupting the Islamic order.  This is a not so much a matter of being immoral as it is a matter of subversion—that is: sowing discord in Dar al-Islam.  Meanwhile, “those who oppress” is taken to mean any ruler who governs according to anything other than sharia.  According to this standard, liberal democracy would be seen as a kind of “oppression”…from which people need to be liberated.

So the question arises: When assaying the Koran in its entirety, are we simply dealing with inconsistent messaging?

In addressing this exegetical conundrum, we might note that an abusive husband doesn’t beat his wife EVERY day.  Indeed, he may actually be rather nice to her from time to time.  How, then, shall his character be assessed?

TWO:  Verse 256 of Surah 2 tells us that “there is no compulsion in religion.”  This may be read as: “If people don’t believe, then don’t try to coerce them; let them be damned if that’s the path they choose.”  The message here is clear once we read the subsequent verse (257).  6:66 and 42:48 confirm this (less estimable) position.  Obviously, FORCING everyone to believe would sabotage the grand trial that is “dunya”.  After all, life here on Earth is seen as a “test” in which people are condemned on the Day Of Judgement because they CHOSE not to believe.

This attitude may be expressed as follows: “Don’t lose any sleep at night over the fact that certain people—nay, the majority of the human race—will be condemned to eternal hellfire.  Interceding in the fates of others (in the hereafter) is not your prerogative; it is god’s province alone.  Attend to your own salvation, and don’t spend too much time trying to sway those who deny the Koran.”

The best one can do, then, is let non-believers know about the Sunnah.  The rest is in god’s hands.  If others end up bringing about their own damnation, then so be it.  The upshot of 2:256 is: Trying to save others’ souls is not within your jurisdiction.  (This interpretation is in keeping with 109:6.)

There is actually some credence to this thinking.  One cannot fake what is in one’s heart; and others cannot control what is truly within one’s heart.  In this sense, it is not so much that compulsion in religion is PROHIBITED; it’s that it CAN’T EXIST.  2:256 is a claim about the human condition, not a normative statement.  In other words: it is descriptive, not prescriptive.

As far as the protagonist of the Koran is concerned, there is no compulsion in religion in the same way that nobody is OBLIGATED to partake in Juche in North Korea.  “It’s up to you; just know that there will be consequences for your choice.”  That’s not religious freedom; that’s tyranny.

The Koran is adamant about the fact that, whatever one decides for oneself (insofar as one even pretends to have a say in one’s own fate), there shall be repercussions…both in this world and in the hereafter.  As far as the consequences DURING life go, non-Muslims clearly have inferior status (which is, at best, “Dhimmi”).  For they are THE OTHER (“zalim”).  Notably, non-Muslim “People of the Book” must pay an extra tax (“jizya”) for their lack of (proper) Faith.  According to this linguistic scheme, such a relegation to inferior status does not count as “compulsion”.  Within the Islamic dominion, everyone was subject to sharia; and THAT was the only compulsion that mattered.

The Koran essentially says: Don’t fuss over others’ Faith; for we are each going to get what’s coming to us in the end anyway.  Let god sort it out.  In the meantime, believers should be wary of those not in the Ummah.  19:48 confirms this, when Abraham tells his own father (who refused to honor his god) that he will leave him (that is: not try to sway him).

And so it goes: 2:256 is not an entreaty for religious tolerance; it is an observation of man’s powerlessness in the face of Providence.  This is confirmed by 10:99-100, which tells us not to bother pressuring anyone into conversion, because god has already selected who will and won’t believe.  (Per the doctrine of “qadar”, it has been pre-ordained who shall be saved and who shall be damned.) So we’d best leave well enough alone, and–pace dawa–focus on the state of our own soul.

There was an undeniable practicality to this approach to dawa.  For the early Mohammedans, forced conversion would have created the problem of posers.  Subsequently, everyone’s fealty would have been in question; and it would have been difficult to identify (covert) infidels in the ranks.

We might also note a related passage (verse 6 of Surah 109), which states: “Unto you your ‘din’; unto me my ‘din’” (where “din” is variously interpreted as “way of life” or “religion”).  This would seem to be an endorsement of freedom of religion; even of secularism.  But not so fast.  It does not follow from this that non-Muslims should not be treated as inferiors.

Taking the theme of “qadar” (pre-destination) into account, the message of 2:256 becomes: Some of us are divinely ordained to be guided; others are not.  It’s not up to us to decide who the saved and who the damned might be.  So when we are told “unto you your religion; unto me mine”, it is simply a recognition of the divergent fates of the saved and the damned; NOT some sort of clarion call for global human solidarity (let alone an entreaty for toleration, pluralism, and inclusivity). This myopic sense of “religious freedom” had some serious strings attached…just as in, say, North Korea.

In a sense, NO Faith is compulsory.  For the entire point of “Faith” is that it’s a choice one makes for oneself.  Thus 2:256 is perfectly in keeping with the rest of the Koran, which clearly states that one does not HAVE TO be Muslim.  Indeed, it would defeat the entire purpose of the Koran’s salvation-damnation scheme if everyone were required to be in Dar al-Islam.  There would be nothing “special” about those who were in it.  And god wouldn’t get to fill up hell–as he so eagerly wants to do.

In any case, 109:6 is—like 2:256—more DE-scriptive than PRE-scriptive.  The point is that there, in fact, IS NO compulsion when it comes to Faith; not that there SHOULD NOT be.  This means that all of us must ultimately make up our own minds about the fate of our eternal souls.  It’s not MY problem if YOU make the wrong choice; nor is it YOUR problem if I make the wrong choice.

So is 109:6 to be taken as an adjuration to simply live and let live?  Shall we all just shrug our shoulders and–with resignation–say, “To each his own”?  Not really. The message is clear once we consider the message conveyed in the rest of the Koran: Don’t take judgement (esp. regarding matters of Faith) into your own hands because god will take care of it.  This is based not merely on 2:256; it is made clear in passages like 9:66, 18:29, 10:99, 16:106, and 88:21-22 as well.

Be that as it may, squaring all this with passages like 4:89 might be rather difficult. There, the supplicant IS urged to take matters into his own hands whenever there is “mischief in the land”; thereby giving license that is somewhat open-ended.  For “mischief” is a vague reference to “fitna” (disruption of the Islamic order), which can entail any perceived dissent from the Sunnah.

Recall that, historically, it is not Islamic FAITH that was spread by the sword, it was Islamic LAW.  It was not religiosity (“iman”) PER SE that was forced upon conquered populations; it was a political dominion (“sharia”) that was geographically expanded.  When enlarging the realm of sovereignty, coerced conversion is un-necessary, as SUBJUGATION is the point.  So long as everyone is beholden to the diktats of those enforcing the creed, the rest is a moot point.  Even “Daesh” often allowed for “Dhimmi” in its midst.

Max Weber put it accurately when he noted: “[Islam] makes obligatory the violent propagandizing of a true prophecy that consciously eschews universal conversion and enjoins the subjugation of unbelievers under the dominion of a ruling class dedicated to the religious war as one of the basic postulates of its faith, without however recognizing the salvation of the subjugated.  The practice of coercion poses no problem, since god is pleased by the forcible dominion of the Faithful over the infidels, who are tolerated once they have been subjugated” (“Sociology of Religion”; p. 227).

In the midst of even the most charitable readings of 2:256 and 109:6, we should bear in mind that non-Muslims are summarily demeaned throughout Islam’s holy book.  They are liars; they are deniers; they are deaf, dumb, and blind; they are the worst of all creatures; etc.  They are constantly vilified.  And in many cases, the reader is instructed, the “kafir” should be slaughtered BECAUSE OF his disbelief.  NONE of this is tantamount to compulsory supplication.  Hence 2:256 and 109:6 make perfect sense…even in a totalitarian theocracy.

In sum: 2:256 and 109:6 both amount to a call to let the damned be damned.  “Don’t try to intervene.  If someone is misled, it is god’s will.  Who are YOU to question it?”  To reiterate: This attitude is based on the (accurate) observation that COERCED Faith is not GENUINE Faith.

The practical implication of this is relatively straight-forward: “Notify non-Muslims of Islam, introduce them to the Koran, and the rest is out of your hands.  If they choose not to convert, then so be it.” That is the extent of “dawa”.

Other religions serve to illustrate this point.  In a certain sense, Haredim do not believe that there is compulsion in religion either.  That doesn’t make their cult any less deranged; nor does it make them paragons of religious freedom.  In a sense, religious fanatics are not focused on evangelism so much as they are with demarcating OTHER-ness.  They don’t lose sleep at night knowing that THE OTHER is doomed to perdition.

“Dawa” is often taken to mean a campaign to enlighten (read: indoctrinate) the un-initiated; yet it is best translated as “spreading the word”.  Such an endeavor—no matter how assiduously it is undertaken—does not involve “compulsion”.  Dawa, then, is not so much about some grand soul-saving mission (as it is with, say, Christian missionaries); it is simply about making people aware of the “din”, and letting the chips fall where they may…all the while, doing so with the understanding that “If you don’t play along, you’ll be sorry.”

This attitude does not require compulsion…unless, that is, we consider the imposition of draconian incentives a form of compulsion.  But the Koran does not count its carrots and sticks (promise of Paradise vs. threat of hellfire) as a form of “compulsion”. It’s just an articulation of cosmogony.

As if to make things confusing, 13:15 indicates that compulsion in religion may be permissible after all!

It does not follow from any of this that the Koran is advocating for what we would now consider “religious freedom”.  If someone is threatened with dire punishment if they do not toe the line, they are still—in a rather obtuse sense—FREE TO CHOOSE.  (In this sense, North Korea is as free as any other nation.)

The bottom line: As long as heresy is posited as a moral transgression, as is done throughout the Koran, genuine religious freedom is an untenable prospect.

THREE:  Verse 32 of Surah 5 states: “Whoever kills a person, UNLESS for another person OR for causing mischief in the land [undermining the ability of Muslims to promulgate the Sunnah], it is as if he had killed all mankind… And whoever saves [the life of a non-transgressing person], it shall be as though he had saved all mankind.”  This is perhaps the most commonly cited passage by those who insist the Koran obliquely enjoins some variation on humanism.

The catch here is that the passage is citing an enjoinder that was found in the Torah. As it turns out, the enjoinder was addressed explicitly to Hebrews (in reference to Cain’s murder of his brother, Able).  Thus 5:32 is merely harking back to the Abrahamic deity’s admonishment to the children of Israel; and it pertains exclusively to the killing of fellow Hebrews.  Killing those OUTSIDE the tribe was deemed unproblematic.  So the invocation is not nearly as magnanimous as it might seem. *

Moreover, the stipulated EXCEPTIONS (which are often omitted from charitable quotations) are significant: UNLESS for another person OR for disrupting the Islamic order.  Such caveats alter what is an otherwise splendid-sounding admonition against killing.

As it happens, the true spirit of the passage is revealed IN THE VERY NEXT VERSE (5:33).  The passage is actually a CALL TO ARMS, not a plea for peace.  The full message is: “Anyone who causes “fitna” is to be killed; but you should refrain from killing people otherwise.”  This is a far cry from a clarion call for universal human rights.  Quite the contrary, it is indistinguishable from the conditions stipulated by, say, the Roman Catholic Inquisition…or the Nazi Gestapo…or the Soviet Stasi: So long has you aren’t seen as subversive, you have nothing to worry about.

Let’s look at the passage in its entirety: “From the time that we [the Abrahamic deity] ordained for the people of Israel that he who slays [“qatala”] a soul other than one who does so for another soul or for spreading mischief / corruption in the land, it is as if he had slain ‘al-nas[a]’; and anyone who spares [“ahya”] a soul, it is as if he has spared the lives of ‘al-nas[a]’.”

Here, “al-nas[a]” means “the people”.  The locution used is actually “al-nasa jami’an” meaning “the whole people”.  More charitably, “nas” can be interpreted as “mankind”.  Hence the lexeme can refer either to just the “ummah” (the community of believers) or to humanity itself.  Such a charitable interpretation can also be used for, say, 4:114, which states that there is no good in “najwahum” [“their secret talk”] except for those who “enjoin charity, kindness, or conciliation” amongst “al-nas[i]”.  Does this encourage amity solely within Dar al-Islam, or does it extend to Dar al-Kafr?  It’s unclear.

And so it goes: We might treat this verse as though it were touting the following maxim: To take the life of one person is to—essentially—perpetrate murder against all of humanity; and to save a life is to–essentially–save all of humanity.  However the Koran does not put it quite this way.  It does not put it that way because it CANNOT put it this way; as doing so would directly contradict the slew of verses that urge followers to be hostile to outsiders.  5:32 clearly meant something other than what many apologists profess.

We should note that it is a harkening back to an exhortation the Abrahamic deity made to the Hebrews (that which he “ordained for Israel”).  It is not, then, a direct exhortation to the Mohammedans.

Let’s explore the caveat: OTHER THAN those who are spreading mischief [“fasadin”] (where “mischief” means sowing discord).  Hence: Killing others is fine if they are being subversive.  Who “makes mischief”?  Those who stand in the way of the promulgation of Islam or in any way undermine the Sunnah.  (Thus: Not being Muslim is fine, so long as one does not disrupt the Islamic order; as explicated in 4:89.)  Note that the key term in this caveat, “fasadin”, can also be translated as “spreading corruption” (undermining the Sunnah; disrupting the the Islamic order).  Corruption of what?  Of god’s word, of the Faith, of MoM’s teachings.  Hence anyone who fetters “dawa” or flouts sharia is not to be considered innocent…and is thus “fair game”.

Such a proviso undermines any interpretation that takes “nas” to mean all mankind, irrespective of their Faith.  For it explicitly provides an exception to the stricture.  Therefore an accurate reading of the ubiquitously touted exhortation must include the rider: “…EXCEPT if they go against Islam.”  Taking this into account, 5:32 suddenly doesn’t sound so noble after all.  Indeed, when putting it in context, the injunction against killing “innocent” people suddenly takes on a more devious tenor.

Bear in mind that the perpetrators of every pogrom in history have claimed that their targets were “guilty” of, well, SOMETHING (typically, subversive / heretical activity).  Indeed, EVERYONE claims to never do bad things to those they’ve deemed to be “innocent”.  Those who are persecuted are ALWAYS held to deserve it (to have brought it upon themselves).  The question, then, is: How do the authors define “innocent”?

To answer this, it is prudent to consider the (inter-textual) context of the touted statement.  As it turns out, we need only read the verse DIRECTLY FOLLOWING the verse-in-question (5:33), which specifies the punishment for those who go against the Abrahamic deity and his appointed messenger (i.e. by “making mischief”).  Such transgressors “should be murdered or crucified or their hands and feet cut off on opposite sides or should be imprisoned.”  There is a notable juxtaposition between 5:32 and 5:33.  The former is addressed to the Jews; the latter is addressed to the Muslims.

Thus the passage in toto is of the form: “Recall that, in days of yore, god said A to those other people (Jews); but now, he is saying B to you (Muslims).”

A: Regarding he who takes the life of anyone (any Hebrew, that is) other than those who have blasphemed, it is as if he has taken the life of all mankind; and he who saves the life of someone (any Hebrew) who has not blasphemed, it is as if he has saved all mankind.

B: As for those who HAVE blasphemed (or who are arrayed against the anointed tribe, now understood to be Mohammedans), you shall slay them, or crucify them, or cut off their hands and feet on opposite sides, or imprison them.

The protected group thus went from Beth Israel to Dar al-Islam.  This amounts to a mandate to value the lives of those who submit to Islam (and a reminder of how grave a transgression it is to kill them)…followed by a directive to go ahead and kill / torture those who refuse to submit to Islam.  This is in keeping with the exhortation to kill non-Muslims wherever you find them (found in 2:191, 4:89, and 9:5).  5:32 is merely citing an admonishment given by the Abrahamic deity TO the Hebrews solely REGARDING the Hebrews; and then proceeds to provide an altogether different message to its intended audience: the Mohammedans.

Hence: If people are “innocent”, do not kill them.  HOWEVER, if they are “guilty”, then you are obligated to kill / torture / imprison them (where innocence and guilt are functions of concordance with the Sunnah).  This accords with the rest of Islam’s holy book—as with 8:12, 9:73, 47:3-4, and 66:9.

Taken within the context of the verse following it, 5:32 ends up meaning something markedly different from what Progressively-inclined Muslims would very much like it to mean (and what it SEEMS to mean when quoted out of context). **

But what are we to do of the (more familiar) adage that taking one life—ANY life—is like killing all humanity (and that saving one life is like saving all humanity)?  Is this not a maxim that Muslims and non-Muslims alike should espouse?  Could we not at least PRETEND that this is what the authors of 5:32 meant?  Well, then, perhaps the Koran’s protagonist could take his own advise.

Are we to suppose, then, that the Koran is sending mixed messages?  Let’s grant, for a moment, the primacy of the passages adumbrated in this Appendix.  If one were to espouse the most charitable interpretation of these (10) felicitous-seeming passages, one would still find oneself in somewhat of an exegetical pickle; as one would be forced to ignore—nay, REJECT—the (41) problematic passages enumerated earlier.

{*  It’s worth noting the antecedent Abrahamic lore on which this oft-quoted “ayah” was based.  While it is an allusion to the tale of Cain and Abel (in which the Abrahamic deity admonishes the people of Israel against murder), the Koranic verse seems to have been an adaptation of a passage not from the Torah, but from the Mishnah; as compiled by Judah ha-Nasi at the end of the 2nd century A.D.  (The specific wording was lifted from Sanhedrin 37a.) The Talmudic passage, which was explicitly addressed to Jews, was probably written in Syriac, as was most Talmudic literature during Late Antiquity.  It reads as follows: “Whosoever destroys a single soul of Israel, scripture imputes [guilt] to him as though he had destroyed a complete world; and whosoever preserves a single soul of Israel, scripture ascribes [merit] to him as though he had preserved a complete world.”  Thus 5:32 was lifted from Judaic sources.  Interpreted charitably, we are asked to suppose that taking a single human life is tantamount to an affront to humanity itself.  However, the meaning of the Talmudic passage involves a narrowly circumscribed prohibition.  That is: The proscription pertains exclusively to fellow Hebrews.  After Cain slayed his brother, the Abrahamic deity decreed “to the Children of Israel” (that is: to the sons of Jacob) that to do as Cain did was—effectively—to impugn (i.e. commit a crime against) all god’s creation.  Cain’s crime, then, was not that he killed another person; it’s that he killed another HEBREW—namely: his brother, Abel, who was righteous.  Not only was it permissible to slaughter non-Hebrews; committing genocide against others was often MANDATED.}

{** Another interpretation of this admonishment (against illicit killing) is that it pertains to the severity of the punishment in the hereafter.  Taken this way, the message is: The murder of even a single person warrants the same punishment as would the (hypothetical) murder of everyone.  Hence the threshold for maximal opprobrium (that is: the standard for transgressions warranting maximum punishment) is its commission against a single soul.  Hence god will make no distinction between murdering one person and xenocide.  If this is what the authors had in mind, it is likely they were using hyperbole to make a point.  For it was clearly the killing of fellow Muslims that was seen as problematic, not the killing of “kuffar”.}